Criminal Law

In prosecutions on health care fraud and unlawful possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for appointment of new counsel that was made after trial on firearms charge and just three weeks prior to start of trial on fraud charge. While defendant argued that appointment of new counsel was required given breakdown in communications with his counsel and given fact that said counsel had previously portrayed him in negative light, Dist. Ct. could properly deny said request, where, although record indicated existence of tension between defendant and his counsel, Dist. Ct. could have inferred that said request was another attempt by defendant to stall proceedings given fact that instant request was filed shortly before start of second trial, and that defendant had already gone through three sets of attorneys during first trial and had unnecessarily delayed start of first trial. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in restraining defendant’s ability to access proceeds of six insurance policies, even though defendant argued that said proceeds would have allowed him to hire counsel of his choice, where: (1) defendant declined Dist. Ct.’s invitation to seek immediate hearing to establish whether instant policies had been obtained from proceeds of illegal conduct; (2) nothing in record showed that said policies were not tainted by defendant’s alleged fraud; and (3) defendant failed to show that said policies were actually needed to obtain counsel of his choice, where record also showed that defendant had net worth of $500,000 exclusive of said policies.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s determination that defendant had violated term his original supervised release, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant had committed Class A violation of said term arising out of incident in which defendant committed aggravated battery on fellow inmate. While defendant argued that no aggravated battery occurred arising out of said incident, Dist. Ct. could properly find that aggravated battery occurred and that said incident qualified as Class A violation, where record showed that defendant had battered said inmate while both were in county jail. Moreover, instant incident qualified as “crime of violence” under USSG. Also, defendant waived any objection with respect to duration of Dist. Ct.’s subsequently imposed three-year term of supervised release or any specific conditions of said release, where defendant had specifically indicated that three-year term would be appropriate and told Dist. Ct. he would withdraw any objections to suggested terms of his supervised release.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 60-month term of incarceration based, in part, on imposition of two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice that arose out of defendant’s alleged untruthful testimony given during suppression hearing concerning different defendant before different judge. While defendant’s testimony at suppression hearing involving different defendant could support imposition of obstruction of justice enhancement in his own criminal matter, Ct. of Appeals found that Dist. Ct. lacked sufficient factual basis to impose instant enhancement, where Dist. Ct. based findings primarily on interim impressions of Dist. Ct. presiding at suppression hearing, which were made prior to defendant’s testimony at suppression hearing. Moreover, while Ct. of Appeals doubted whether defendant would receive lower sentence on remand since he received sentence that was lower that applicable guideline range that would apply without enhancement, it could not say that instant error was harmless.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration on charge of transportation of minor across state lines with intent to have minor engage in prostitution, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. had violated his due process rights by basing said sentence, in part, on inaccurate information that additional mental health treatment would most likely not have lasting impact on defendant’s ability to refrain from further criminal conduct. Defendant failed to make requisite showing that information regarding his mental history was inaccurate, where record established that despite many medical and environmental interventions, defendant had consistently engaged in dangerous and unlawful behavior. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did nothing more than make appropriate prediction about defendant’s future conduct and his ability to lead law abiding life based on accurate information regarding his mental history.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s second section 2255 habeas petition challenging his 200-month term of incarceration, even though: (1) said sentence was based on Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant had qualified for armed career criminal status due, in part, to defendant’s prior Illinois burglary conviction; and (2) Haney, 840 F.3d 472, found that Illinois burglary conviction did not satisfy definition of “violent felony” for purposes of treatment as armed career criminal. While defendant had raised viable legal argument, he could not obtain any relief under instant successive habeas petition, since defendant raised only statutory, rather than constitutional argument, which did not rest on Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551, or any other retroactive rule of constitutional law. Ct., though, raised potential of defendant obtaining relief under section 2241 petition filed in jurisdiction where he is currently confined.