Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in hidden cavity of defendant’s Suburban rental vehicle, even though defendant argued that although officer had sufficient cause to stop his vehicle on traffic violation, officer lacked reasonable suspicion to continue detention of defendant and his passenger, which eventually led to officer obtaining drug dog to conduct sniff test, after officer had issued warning ticket. Officer had reasonable suspicion to continue defendant’s detention where: (1) prior to issuing ticket, officer learned that neither defendant nor his passenger was legally entitled to drive vehicle; (2) by time officer had written ticket, he heard conflicting stories from defendant and his passenger about circumstances of prior stop by Kansas police, with defendant insisting that vehicle had been searched by Kansas police; (3) officer was also aware of defendant’s lengthy criminal history that included prior drug trafficking offense; and (4) officer only detained defendant for two minutes after issuing ticket, when he learned of additional inconsistency between defendant and his passenger regarding how Suburban had been rented. Fact that officer waited additional 14 minutes after issuing ticket to call for drug dog did not transform incident into unreasonably prolonged stop.

Dist. Ct did not err in granting govt.’s motion to transfer to adult court multiple offenses relating to two armed robberies allegedly committed by defendant when he was 15 years old, but was almost 21 years old at time of instant motion. Charged offenses alleged that: (1) defendant was getaway driver in first armed robbery in which one customer was shot and another customer was grazed by bullet and participated in second armed robbery in which defendant had shot store clerk; and (2) defendant participated in said charged offenses with three other gang members. While Dist. Ct. could properly continue to exercise juvenile jurisdiction even though defendant became 21 during instant proceedings, Dist. Ct. also properly found that transfer to adult court was appropriate under factors set forth in section 5032 of Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act, where: (1) defendant’s age meant that any juvenile-rehabilitation program would not be of much benefit; (2) instant charged offenses were serious in nature; (3) defendant had extensive juvenile criminal record involving 30 separate incidents; and (4) defendant had responded poorly in past treatment programs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his 22-year sentence on drug conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for inducing him to plead guilty by improperly telling him that govt. would recommend sentence of no more than 10 years. Defendant denied existence of any such promise during plea colloquy, and trial counsel conceded during pre-sentence hearing that prosecutor had not agreed to any 10-year sentence cap. Moreover, even if trial counsel had told defendant of existence of 10-year sentence cap, defendant failed to assert that he was either innocent of charged offense or that he would have gone to trial had it not been his belief that he would get sentence capped at 10 years by pleading guilty. Also, defendant could not prevail in instant claim, where he either lied to sentencing court by saying “no” to existence of undisclosed promise that induced him to plead guilty, or if he was confused about existence of sentencing cap, sentencing court disabused him of such confusion by informing him that he could be sentenced to 60 years.

Defendant filed motion seeking leave to file successive habeas petition that challenged his sentence, which was based, in part, on finding that he qualified for negative treatment as armed career criminal under 18 USC section 924(e), where defendant asserted that he was entitled to new sentence under Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2552, which held that residual clause of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutional. Defendant challenged finding that his Illinois conviction for attempted robbery qualified as crime of violence for purposes of ACCA, and although Ct. of Appeals had previously found in unpublished order that said offense qualified as crime of violence, defendant was entitled to raise issue in instant habeas petition.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on arson charge, even though defendant argued that govt. had failed to show that he poured gasoline and ignited fire at arson site, or that building at issue in arson charge substantially affected interstate commerce. Testimony of defendant’s former girlfriend indicated that she and defendant visited gas station prior to going to subject building on night of arson, and jury could infer that defendant poured gasoline and set building on fire where former girlfriend testified that: (1) defendant took backpack that could have contained gas container to building; and (2) she waited over two-hour period near building’s site before defendant appeared with garbage bags full of items from building. Also, govt. satisfied evidentiary burden for interstate commerce element of arson charge where building at issue was rental property. Defendant also forfeited any argument that govt. improperly introduced into evidence his alleged inculpatory statement that he did not “mean to hurt Jimmy,” where defendant argued that he was unaware of existence of said statement, which differed from two others that had been disclosed to him, since defendant failed to seek modification of record under Fed. R. App. P. 10(e) to include previously disclosed statements into record so as to allow Ct. of Appeals ability to fully consider said issue.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress firearms seized during traffic stop, even though defendant argued that officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop. Record showed that officer made stop after noting that defendant’s Indiana temporary tag registration looked odd because it was displayed where license plate normally went, and that check of relevant database did not contain number displayed on tag. As such, officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop, where officer reasonably believed that tag might be forgery designed to hide stolen vehicle. Fact that tag was properly displayed under Indiana law, or that absence of tag number in database could be explained by recent purchase of vehicle, did not require different result. Moreover, officer’s check of database did not constitute separate improper 4^th Amendment search. Also, defendant failed to show that database used by officer to check tag registration was unreliable.