(McAuliffe, R-Chicago; Morrison, D-Deerfield) authorizes the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt rules to establish a pilot program for electronic filing of petitions for temporary orders of protection and the issuance of those orders by audio-visual means. Its intent is to accommodate litigants for whom attendance in court would be an undue hardship or risk harm to them. Passed both chambers.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of stalking and cyberstalkiing. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the general stalking statute, and also subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the cyberstalking statute, of which Defendant was convicted and sentenced, lack a mens rea requirement and are thus facially unconstitutional under due process clause of 14th Amendment. Thus, Defendant's convictions are vacated.(ROCHFORD and HOFFMAN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery. Given overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that outcome of trial would have been different but for defense counsel's promise in opening statement that Defendant would testify. Decision whether or not to testify was Defendant's decision and his alone, and any problem arising from defense counsel's opening statement was attributable to Defendant's decision to not testify. Thus, Defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under either prong of Strickland. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 37 years, as court properly considered seriousness of offense and relevant factors in mitigation and aggravation in imposing sentence within statutory range. (SIMON, concurring; HYMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
When a postconviction petition leads to resentencing, the court should treat a new petition filed after the resentencing as an initial postconviction petition, which the petitioner has a right to file, and which the trial court should dismiss only if the petitioner fails to state the gist of a claim for a deprivation of his constitutional rights.(PIERCE and SIMON, concurring.)
Court properly denied Defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant alleged that he met cause requirement as 2006 Report of Special State's Attorney, corroborating his claims of physical coercion by police officers, was not available to him at time of filing of petition or trial. Defendant failed to meet cause prong, as he failed to identify an objective factor that impeded his efforts to raise issue of coerced statement in earlier proceeding, and he could have but did not raise that claim on direct appeal or in his first postconviction proceeding.(MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 5 counts attempted first-degree murder, 2 counts of aggravated battery with a firearm, and 1 count of armed violence.Court had never made an explicit finding that victim's injuries constituted severe bodily injury, which requires a degree of harm to victim that is something more than that required to create aggravated battery offense. Isolated comment about "seriousness" of victims injuries cannot serve as basis for upholding court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Because court failed to make requisite findings of severe bodily injury before imposing consecutive sentences, imposition of consecutive sentences on 2 counts, and court's judgment requiring concurrent sentences on 3 counts to be served consecutively to 2 other counts, are vacated.(SCHOSTOK and McLAREN, concurring.)
(Biss, D-Skokie; Williams, D-Chicago) creates the Citizen Privacy Protection Act to regulate the use of “stingrays” that simulate a cell site tower to trick cell phones into using them. This bill prevents law enforcement from using stingrays unless they get a court order based on probably cause and may only be used for to locate or track the location of a communications device. Passed both chambers.
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his bank robbery conviction on ground that Wisc. state court improperly denied his request to represent himself at trial, after said court found that defendant was not competent to represent himself. Said denial of defendant’s request to represent himself conflicted with standards set forth in Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, where state court improperly: (1) required defendant to persuade it that defendant was making knowing and voluntary decision to waive his right to counsel; (2) required defendant to persuade it that he had good reason to chose self-representation; and (3) imposed too high of competence standard, where defendant had 10th grade education and college level reading skill, and where court failed to identify any mental illness or impairment.
(Court opinion corrected 6/22/16.)Defendant physician was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of criminal sexual assault of female patient, who was 8 months pregnant, during gynecological examination; Defendant was sentenced to 2 consecutive terms of 11 and 7 years. Victim reported assault to police a few weeks afterward, but State did not charge Defendant until 8 years later. State timely filed charges, as statute allows 10 year period to prosecute if victim reported offense to police within 2 years. Jury found that Defendant's conduct was a sexual assault for which victim did not give knowing consent. No conflict of interest existed as to Assistant Public Defendant appointed to represent Defendant, and her refusal to pursue unmeritorious claims does not establish incompetent or unwilling representation. (MASON and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 144-month term of incarceration on drug distribution charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on two-level enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(2) of USSG for maintaining premises for purpose of distributing controlled substance, as well as on denial of two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility for pleading guilty to said charge. Enhancement was proper, even though defendant did not have actual possession of apartment where drugs were sold, since record showed that defendant controlled activities at apartment, packaged drugs at said apartment, told customers to purchase drugs there, and dealt drugs on at least 50 occasions at said apartment. Fact that apartment was family dwelling for others did not require different result since drug activities at said apartment need not constitute exclusive use of apartment to qualify for enhancement. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for downward adjustment, where Dist. Ct. had also found that defendant had obstructed justice by directing others to pressure customer to change his testimony regarding defendant’s assault on customer due to customer's inability to pay drug debt.