Criminal Law

After bench trial, Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted of murder. Defendant's mandatory life-without-parole sentence, which was imposed on Defendant for conduct he committed when he was 17; and remanded for resentencing. Court's order denying Defendant leave to file successive postconviction petition is reversed, as Defendant established a colorable claim of actual innocence. Court had dismissed Defendant's initial postconviction, because counsel failed to submit 4 affidavits in support of his actual-innocence claim. Defendant could not submit affidavits on his own, and he was barred from challenging his postconviction counsel's effectiveness at a successive postconviction petition. Deficient performance of postconviction counsel may constitute "cause", and should also excuse failure to present new evidence in an earlier postconviction petition under these facts.(GORDON, specially concurring; McBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of attempted 1st degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, all resulting from 1 incident in 2004. In prior appeal, Defendant claims that court erred by dismissing his petition at 2nd stage, because he made substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call 2 alibi witnesses at trial. A defendant's voluntary absence from trial does not diminish the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Record shows that defense counsel did investigate alibi witnesses; and that his decision to not call those witnesses may have been a matter of trial strategy, and thus not objectively unreasonable.(REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant appeals conduct of 2nd Krankel hearing, and argues that Krankel counsel was ineffective because he abdicated his role to represent Defendant when he abandoned Defendant's specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Krankel counsel was obligated to present any nonfrivolous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that his investigation revealed. Krankel counsel's decision not to adopt allegation about witness' purported statement was deficient representation; trial counsel did not adequately investigate witness and his statement.(HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of heroin.  State presented sufficient evidence, via forensic chemist's stipulated testimony, that heroin seized from Defendant weighed 15.2 grams. Applicability of sentencing provision is ambiguous as to Defendant, who was on monitored release from sentence of county impact incarceration at time of arrest. Court erred in imposing extended-term sentence on Defendant's Class 4 felonies. Remanded for resentencing, with directions that court order sentence to be served concurrently with those imposed in 2 other Cook County cases, and to reduce sentences for Class 4 felonies to 3 years. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring)

(Court opinion corrected 7/6/16.) Defendant was arrested on a city bus after police officers investigated a call that a person on that bus was carrying a weapon. Defendant pled guilty to 1 charge of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) in exchange for 6-year prison sentence, and State nolle prosequied the remaining 7 counts. Defendant's conviction pursuant to subsection (3)(B) of Criminal Code (which prohibits possession of an uncased firearm that is unloaded and the ammunition for weapon is immediately accessible) must be vacated, as principle of People v. Aguilar finding of subsection (3)(A) as facially unconstitutional extends to subsection (3)(B). Appeal concerns only court's denial of Section 2-1401 petition to vacate conviction of AUUW, and any issues related to nolle prosequied counts are not properly before Appellate Court.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court declared Defendant a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and committed him to custody of Director of Corrections. Eight years later, Defendant filed motion which court construed as application for recovery. An evaluator filed a socio-psychiatric report, concluding that under DSM-V, Defendant no longer qualified for diagnosis of pedophilic disorder and thus was not longer an SDP. After bench trial, court properly found State had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence Defendant remained an SDP, and ordered Defendant to be discharged without conditions. SDP Act means that discharge is to be ordered if the Defendant is no longer sexually dangerous. Court is to consider present, not past, mental conditions and determines whether a person is sexually dangerous on date of decision.(HARRIS, specially concurring; STEIGMANN, dissenting.)