(Nekritz, D-Buffalo Grove; Raoul, D-Chicago) prohibits a minor from being incarcerated for a Class 3 or 4 felony violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. It makes an exception for a third or subsequent judicial finding of a violation of probation for substantial noncompliance with court-ordered treatment or programming. Limits the current five-year mandatory probation to minors found guilty of first-degree murder, and probation terms for Class X and forcible felonies are reduced to a minimum of three years, two years, or 18 months depending on the offense. Passed both chambers.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI and of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident, and sentenced to 2 years probation and a suspended sentence. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. Facts observed by officer when he arrested Defendant were probable cause to support arrest. Defendant showed signs of being under influence of drugs, including dilated pupils, deliberate and lethargic movements, slurred speech, and difficulty keeping his eyes open, and he failed all 3 field sobriety tests. Officer's actions were reasonable within the "community caretaking" doctrine. Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony from a drug expert (called "drug recognition expert" by parties) to testify as to his opinion on effects of certain drugs. Evidence was sufficient to support conviction.(REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 6/6/16.) Defendant, after being charged with 2 counts of 1st degree murder, posted bond and fled, and was captured in California 15 years later. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, and sentenced to 35 years. Counsel did not render ineffective assistance in making strategic choice to pursue an "all-or-nothing" defense, or in failing to request that court consider 2nd degree murder, as court was empowered to consider this lesser offense regardless of counsel's arguments. No prejudice in such failure, as court did consider and reject any contention that Defendant had reasonable or unreasonable belief in self-defense.(GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.)
(Barbara Wheeler, R-Crystal Lake; Raoul, D-Chicago) allows a person to petition for expungement at any time for an offense occurring before their 18th birthday if no petition for delinquency was filed, the minor was charged with an offense but the petition was dismissed without a finding of delinquency, the minor was found not delinquent, the minor was placed on juvenile court supervision, or was adjudicated for an offense that if committed by an adult would be a Class B or C misdemeanor or petty offense.
Dist. Ct. did not commit procedural error when sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration on child pornography distribution charge, where defendant alleged that Dist. Ct. failed to adequately address his mitigation arguments that included claim that offense level increase did not account for modern computers’ “fast and easy” ability to amass and distribute large collection of pornography. Instant argument was in form of blanket attack against Guidelines’ policy, which Dist. Ct. was not required to discuss, and record otherwise showed that Dist. Ct. did consider such argument. Dist. Ct. also considered but rejected defendant’s claim that: (1) his possession of heinous images should not be viewed as aggravating factor; and (2) his sentence represented unwarranted disparity, where defendant failed to identify offender or group of offenders who received more lenient sentence despite committing similar or more serious misconduct.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of possession of gun in furtherance of drug crime, even though defendant argued that govt. had failed to present sufficient evidence that gun he carried during controlled drug purchase was real. Former members of defendant’s gang testified that gang members were required to carry real guns for use in rival gang territory, where instant controlled purchase occurred, and undercover office present during controlled drug purchase testified that he was positive that defendant’s gun was real. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting out-of-court statement from non-testifying informant at controlled drug purchase, who indicated shortly after defendant had left premises that defendant had gun, since instant statement did not violate Confrontation Clause, because it was non-testimonial in nature where informant did not make statement with intent to establish past fact. Ct. further rejected defendant’s reasonable doubt claim with respect to his racketeering conviction arising out of gang-related beating of fellow gang members. While defendant argued that he did not participate in said assault that concerned two gang members having their hands smashed for violating gang rules, others testified that defendant, who held high rank within gang, chose weapon and picked assailant to inflict assault, all with intent to enforce gang rules.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession with intent to deliver controlled substance, a Class 1 felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Remanded for proper imposition of fines and fees. Sentence was void to extent street-value fine ordered by court was less than street-value of all crack cocaine recovered in this case and court directed on remand to increase street-value fine to reflect value of all crack cocaine seized. (APPLETON and POPE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery and 2 counts of aggravated domestic battery. Section 112A-3(3) of Domestic Violence Act is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. Even though his romantic relationship with Petitioner had ended 15 years prior to incident, that Section treats Petitioner as his family or household member, which is not reasonably related to a public interest. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
Defendant was, in 1991, found not guilty by reason of insanity of first degree murder of a coworker and admitted to mental health center in custody of Illinois Department of Human Services. In 2012, Defendant's treatment team filed petition for treatment plan review, recommending that Defendant be allowed "supervised off-grounds pass privileges". Court properly denied petition after evidentiary hearing, as ample evidence supported court's decision. Although Defendant was progressing positively, he continued to exhibit anger and frustration and would likely have similar or more severe reaction in uncontrolled and potentially volatile environment.(MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Defendant's right to confront witnesses against him was violated when State was allowed to admit a certified letter from Illinois State Police sergeant stating that Defendant had applied for but was denied FOID card based on pending felony indictment. Letter constituted a testimonial affidavit from a nontestifying witness for its truth, which established an element of AUUW. Certified letter was an affidavit, as it was a declaration of facts written down and sworn to by declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and was made under circumstances which would lead objective witness reaosonably to believe that statement would be available for use at a later trial. Whether Defendant owned FOID card was element of AUUW, and thus use of letter at trial was not harmless error.(CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)
