(Scott Bennett, D-Champaign; McAsey, D-Plainfield) creates the Sexual Assault Incident Procedure Act and allows the Illinois State Police to establish administrative rules to standardize requirements for the disclosure of toxicology results and related documents. These administrative rules are designed to provide minimum standard for compliance of toxicology results is not intended to limit the production and discovery of material information. Passed both chambers.
(Tom Bennett, R-Pontiac; Barickman, R-Bloomington) amends the Counties Code to clarify that “all questions” or “ordinances” also includes any resolutions and motions that arise during meetings. It also allows a county at any properly noticed public meeting to take a single or omnibus vote by unanimous consent on any two or more questions, ordinances, resolutions, or motions. The bill states that this is declarative of existing law. It also requires public defenders in counties under one million population prepare and file monthly or quarterly written reports as determined by the county board. Passed both chambers.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 78-month term of incarceration on tax fraud charge and failure to appear charge under 18 USC section 3146(a)(1) (based on defendant’s absence on date of original sentencing hearing), even though Dist. Ct. based said sentence, in part, on 3-level enhancement under section 3C1.3 of USSG arising out of defendant‘s failure to appear at sentencing hearing. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that said enhancement constituted improper double counting, even though Dist. Ct. included in instant sentence separate term under 28 USC section 3147 for failure to appear. Moreover, sentencing guidelines expressly allow cumulative enhancements for same misconduct, and Congress through section 3147 and section 3C1.3 of USSG permits cumulative punishment based on defendant’s failure to appear while released.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of brandishing firearm in relation to crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A) during armed robbery of bank, even though defendant had claimed that he never carried firearm during said bank robbery. While jury heard conflicting testimony on issue, jury could properly believe bank customer who stated that each robber carried firearm. Fact that govt. used testimony of other robber regarding different issues did not require that govt. or jury accept said robber’s testimony that defendant did not carry firearm during robbery. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not commit clear error in admitting testimony of non-expert FBI agent regarding locations of defendant’s cell phone on day before and after robbery, where: (1) defendant did not object to said testimony; and (2) any failure to object could have been part of trial strategy on defense counsel’s part to avoid having to confront stronger witness who authored cell phone report.
Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery with firearm and attempted armed robbery of gas station. Defendant's failure to avail himself of opportunities to withdraw from criminal enterprise demonstrates absence of compulsion. Thus, court properly refused to present jury instruction on affirmative defense of compulsion.Defendant was not prejudiced by exclusion of testimony of his cousin as hearsay, as another witness and Defendant testified about co-Defendant's actions in garage, that he was waving a gun around and pointed it at witness and Defendant.(CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and other weapons offenses. Court improperly considered a factor inherent in offense of first degree murder, giving improper weight to the double enhancing factor. Court expressly stated, in aggravation, that Defendant's conduct did cause harm and acknowledged that this fact was inherent in offense of murder.Defendant should not be subject to DNA analysis fee on remand, as his DNA was previously recorded.(O'BRIEN and CARTER, concurring.)
(Cabello, R-Loves Park; Link, D-Gurnee) amends the plea statute of the Code of Criminal Procedure to require the court to admonish the defendant of the following possible consequences for a conviction or plea of guilty:
(1) Maximum and mental minimum penalty penalty;
(2) Future convictions may be more severe or make possible consecutive sentences;
(3) Registration requirements that may restrict where the defendant may work, live, or be present; and
(4) Affect the defendant’s ability to retain or obtain housing, employment, a firearm, an occupational license, or a driver’s license.
The Access to Justice Act created the Statutory Court Fee Task Force to study the current system of fees, fines, and other court costs and propose recommendations to the Illinois General Assembly and Illinois Supreme Court. Its report may be found at the URL below.
Defendant filed pro se postconviction petition, later amended by private counsel with permission of trial court. Court erred in granting State’s motion to dismiss petition before Defendant had notice and an opportunity to be heard. Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not specifically allow a court to rule on a motion to dismiss ex parte without giving Defendant notice and opportunity to be heard. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request seeking reduction in his 300-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge involving defendant’s distribution of crack cocaine, after Ct. of Appeals had previously issued limited remand to consider such question, even though defendant had initially argued that said reduction was appropriate under 2007 Amendment to section 2D1.1 of USSG concerning guideline’s reduced ratio for crack cocaine to powder cocaine. Dist. Ct. found that no reduction was warranted because defendant was sentenced after Amendment went into effect and because defendant’s extensive criminal history would not warrant any reduction, and defendant presented no challenge to reasonableness of his sentence. Ct. noted that while defendant had also filed with Dist. Ct. habeas petition on defendant’s claim that his appellate counsel had abandoned him during limited remand and Dist. Ct. had granted defendant habeas relief by allowing defendant to present to Ct. of Appeals his reply on his sentencing issue that was not filed by defendant’s counsel in Dist. Ct. during limited remand, defendant should have filed motion to withdraw prior Appellate Court mandate in his original appeal (instead of filing notice of appeal), since Dist. Ct. had never entered new judgment on defendant’s criminal case so as allow defendant to file any notice of appeal.
