Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Defendant was in custody of Peoria County after sentencing in Sangamon County, and thus Section 103-5(a) of speedy trial statute applies, giving State 120 days to bring Defendant to trial. The 120-day speedy trial clock began as soon as Defendant was in custody of Peoria County, and no formal demand for trial is necessary under that Section. Defendant did not agree to delay as he properly objected, and delay was not attributable to Defendant.  Speedy trial error is so serious that it affected fairness of trial and challenged integrity of judicial process. Judgment to be entered dismissing charges. (O'BRIEN and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/9/16.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery. Court properly denied Defendant's motion for 3-week continuance on day of trial, as Defendant had answered ready for trial prior to asking for a continuance, and as Defendant was not diligent in pursuing his defense. Court granted 2-day continuance for Defendant to review the late-tendered discovery. Court did not err in allowing Defendant to present evidence of victim's 14-year-old conviction for domestic violence via stipulation, rather than via live testimony. Defendant had burden to specifically inform court via offer of proof what he anticipated excluded testimony of officers would be. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop. Officer testified that female passenger told another officer that Defendant had concealed something in his buttocks.  Defendant was then searched a 3rd time, and officer retrieved a Baggie, containing drugs. Police dog made positive alert on vehicle with Defendant inside, so that Defendant could be detained for reasonable amount of time while police did drug investigation.  Officers may extend a traffic stop as long as extension is based on evidence leading to reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Defendant's initial consensual search did not dissipate reasonable suspicion Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Searches were reasonable based on police dog's alert and the other information available to officers. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Appeal from a directed finding entered in a postconviction proceeding stemming from a murder case 22 years ago, during which no eyewitness testimony was presented, no physical evidence was admitted, and no weapon was ever recovered. Principal witness from trial has since submitted an affidavit that his testimony was false in all respects and was coerced by detectives.  Many other witnesses provided testimony that they were coerced to falsely implicate people in crimes by same detectives. Considering witness' recantation affidavit under proper directed finding standard, it is impossible to say that it does not bolster Defendant's claim.  Court failed to draw adverse inference from detective's invocation of 5th amendment during postconviction proceeding, but should have considered it at directed finding stage. Defendant and codefendant presented alarming acts of misconduct in underlying investigation and prosecution. Defendant met his burden to go forward on an actual innocence claim. Matter to be assigned to a different postconviction judge upon remand.  (NEVILLE and HYMAN, concurring.)

Appeal from a directed finding entered in a postconviction proceeding stemming from a murder case 22 years ago, during which no eyewitness testimony was presented and no physical evidence was admitted.Principal witness from trial has since submitted an affidavit that his testimony was false in all respects and was coerced by detectives.  Many other witnesses provided testimony that they were coerced to falsely implicate people in crimes by same detectives. Defendant and codefendant presented alarming acts of misconduct in underlying investigation and prosecution. Defendant met his burden to go forward on an actual innocence claim. Matter to be assigned to a different postconviction judge upon remand.  (NEVILLE and HYMAN, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 6/7/16.) Defendant alleged that trial court failed to adequately inquire into his posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Krankel and appellate court's mandate upon remand. Court fully considered Defendant's pro se claim of ineffective assistance by discussing the claim with him, and evaluating the claim based on its knowledge of defense counsel's performance and insufficiency of claim on its face.Cour did not err in denying Defendant's claim without appointing new counsel to investigate it, as court conducted adequate inquiry into Defendant's claim of error. Defense counsel's failure to request lesser included offense instructions of second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter was reasonable exercise of trial strategy. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)