Criminal Law

In prosecution on kidnapping charge arising out of scheme by defendant to fake her pregnancy and kidnap relative’s infant child, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppression certain inculpatory statements given to police after she had been given Miranda warnings, where defendant alleged that said statements were product of coercive tactics used by police during their interrogation of her. Defendant’s interrogation was videotaped, and defendant failed to identify anything about conditions or interrogation tactics that were coercive in terms of physical abuse, psychological abuse or deceptive tactics. Fact that police made repeated requests for consents and waivers to search defendant’s car/phone or to take polygraph or to resume interrogation on following day did not require different result. Moreover, govt. could properly use for purposes of impeachment two statements that Dist. Ct. had suppressed as part of Miranda violation, but nevertheless found to have been voluntarily given, where said statements refuted defendant’s claims that she was in fact pregnant during relevant time period and that she left infant in front of gas station prior to submitting herself to police questioning. Also, govt.’s evidence regarding defendant’s evasive tactics by leaving baby outside gas station in below-zero temperatures belied her contention that she had permission to take baby.

Defendant was entitled to new trial on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, where record showed that one member of jury was likely coerced into finding defendant guilty of said charge, since: (1) during jury polling, first juror, who was asked by Dist. Ct. as to whether she joined in guilty verdict, indicated “no;” (2) Dist. Ct. proceeded to poll remaining jurors, who all stated that they joined in guilty verdict; (3) Dist. Ct. eventually sent jury back for new deliberations knowing that there was only one holdout juror; (4) 10 minutes later, jury sent note that was signed by two different jurors indicating that there was “misunderstanding” about question that was asked during polling, and that jury now had verdict; and (5) Dist. Ct. confirmed with holdout juror that she now joined in guilty verdict before confirming said verdict with remaining jurors. Fact that Dist. Ct. did not intend to coerce holdout juror did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging appellate counsel’s decision not to contest defendant’s three consecutive 40-year sentences on Indiana child molestation charges, even though state court of appeals found that appellate counsel’s failure to do so did not result in prejudice to defendant, since defendant had failed to demonstrate that his 120-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate in light of nature of offense and character of offender. Instant legal issue was question of state law that was not addressable in habeas petition. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that state court should have applied more favorable state-law precedent that arose after date that defendant’s direct appeal had become final. (Dissent filed.)

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of 18 USC section 1951, arising out of defendant’s attempt to collect debt from various debtors on behalf of third-party by using threats of physical violence. While defendant argued that although he had knowledge of single attempt he made to collect debt of one debtor, he was unaware of overarching conspiracy that involved two other attempts to collect debts on behalf of third-party, record contained sufficient evidence to establish that defendant was aware of said overarching conspiracy, where: (1) all three incidents occurred within short time period and concerned common method of debt collection and identical goals; and (2) defendant assisted others in locating individual, who could not be found by others in prior attempt to collect debt. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that his encounter with debtor was too tepid to constitute act of extortion, where incident lasted five minutes and ended with handshake, since: (1) defendant and two others came unannounced to debtor’s office, stood over him and blocked his exit from office; (2) defendant demanded that debtor call creditor to tell him that he (debtor) had “fucked him” and that defendant would deal with debtor thereafter; and (3) debtor’s testimony that he was frightened by said encounter and was concerned for his safety was sufficient to allow jury to interpret defendant’s conduct as exploiting fear to obtain financial gain.