Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing one defendant to 135-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant was liable for between 2 and 10 kilograms of heroin jointly purchased with co-defendant. Drug quantity amount was based on defendant’s own admissions, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was accountable for all of jointly purchased heroin, where defendant introduced co-defendant to drug supplier, polled his money with co-defendant to obtain discounted rate on heroin and traveled with co-defendant to weigh and divide jointly purchased heroin. Fact that co-defendant distributed his share of heroin through separate business was immaterial. Dist. Ct. also did not err in sentencing third defendant to 80-month term of incarceration, even though said defendant argued that her within-guideline range sentence was unreasonable given her reduced life expectancy and health issues. Record showed that defendant’s sentence, reduced by good-time credits, fell below her 90-month life expectancy, and Dist. Ct. was not required to impose below-guideline range sentence simply because defendant had health issues. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had history of violations of pre-trial release conditions, even though defendant never received any sanctions for said violations.

Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support defendant’s money laundering conviction, where there was no evidence that defendant engaged or attempted to engage in monetary transaction using criminally derived property. Moreover, remand was required for new sentencing hearing on remaining wire fraud conviction, with Ct. of Appeals emphasizing that while defendant was “irritant” during trial process, Dist. Ct. cannot lengthen his sentence based upon such misconduct, especially where defendant represented himself during trial.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized by police under circumstances, where police, while monitoring individual suspected of drug activity: (1) saw said individual enter into defendant’s garage and conduct what appeared to be drug transaction with defendant while garage door was open; and then (2) entered into defendant’s garage to effectuate arrest of defendant and monitored individual. Once defendant entered garage with its wide-open-to-any-passer-by view, he no longer had expectation of privacy, and police could enter his garage and effectuate instant warrantless seizure, where: (1) at time of viewing, officers were in place where they had legal right to be; (2) incriminating evidence was in plan view; and (3) incriminating nature of evidence was immediately apparent. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that police did not actually see drug transaction prior to entering his garage, where Dist. Ct.’s credibility findings with respect to officers’ testimonies were not so far-fetched as to defy all plausibility. Moreover, police could properly conduct brief, protective sweep of defendant’s home, which was attached to garage, to determine whether others were in home at time of defendant’s arrest, and officers’ sudden entry into defendant’s garage did not render his subsequent consent to search home involuntary.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying petitioner-prisoner’s habeas petition that challenged respondent’s decision to revoke 90 days of petitioner’s good-time credits based on finding that petitioner possessed heroin in his cell. Petitioner claimed that one officer who conducted search of petitioner’s cell on day in question told him that no drugs were found in his cell, and petitioner was entitled to have said officer testify at his revocation hearing, especially where written report contained discrepancy as to which cell heroin was found. Record also failed to contain sufficient foundation regarding method of testing heroin and relevant chain of custody.

In prosecution on Medicare and insurance fraud claims, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing to recall jury three days after jury rendered its guilty verdict to conduct hearing on claims made by one juror that jury members committed misconduct by expressing dislike for defendant at start of instant trial. Requests for hearing on alleged jury misconduct are generally not permitted under Rule 606(b), since hearing would involve evidence about jury’s deliberations, and while Dist. Ct. discussed at length defendant’s challenge to jury’s verdict, it was entitled to ultimately find that mistrial was not warranted, where instant alleged pre-deliberation discussions by juors may have pertained to defendant’s likeability rather than his guilt or innocence. Moreover, Ct. emphasized that Dist. Ct.’s handling of complaints concerning jury’s conversations prior to deliberations are entitled to great deference.

In prosecution on drug and firearm charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and firearm seized from his apartment, where said seizure occurred after police had obtained permission from apartment property manager to enter locked hallway, and where drug dog alerted to presence of drugs while standing in front of defendant’s apartment door. Holding in Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (i.e, use of trained police dog to investigate home and its immediate surroundings was search under 4^th Amendment that required warrant) applied to hallway outside defendant’s apartment door because police used dog for purpose of gathering incriminating forensic evidence. Moreover, suppression was required because police could not, without warrant, bring “super-sensitive” instrument in form of trained dog to detect objects and activities that they could not perceive without its help. Also, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule did not apply.