Defendant pled guilty to aggravated DUI, and State agreed to sentencing cap and dismissed charges based on plea, making it a negotiated plea. Thus, Defendant could not appeal from negotiated plea unless first filing motion to withdraw plea and vacate judgment. Defendant failed to file notice of appeal within 30 days of denial of that motion, and instead filed the correct motion: motion to withdraw plea. As notice of appeal was untimely, appellate court has no jurisdiction over appeal.(McDADE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 3/25/16.) Court struck Defendant's postconviction petitions on basis that they violated Defendant's promise, as part of his plea agreement, not to collaterally attack his convictions. Defendant's waiver of his right to file collateral petitions was knowing, voluntary, and intentional; at hearing before plea agreement was final, Defendant acknowledged that proposed agreement would prohibit him from raising any issue in postconviction litigation. No specific admonishments were required, and court's admonishments sufficiently informed Defendant that he was waiving his right to file any type of collateral petition. Postconviction Act requires court to determine whether a petition is frivolous or patently without merit within 90 days of its docketing. As this did not occur, petition is remanded for second-stage proceedings. Court erred in striking petition, as the ruling was premature. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder. Court properly dismissed Defendant's amended postconviction petition, as it did not make a substantial showing of any constitutional violation. Defendant failed to allege that State knew that witnesses were testifying falsely before grand jury, and that witnesses committed perjury. (SCHMIDT, concurring; McDADE, specially concurring.)
Defendants were each charged with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession of a hypodermic needle. Record lacks factors indicative of a seizure rather than a consensual encounter. Although officer testified that Defendants were not free to leave because he was conducting investigation, this was never conveyed to Defendants. Each of the requests of officers were requests rather than orders. Police encounter with one Defendant was consensual all the way through officer's search of him, and he was not seized, for 4th Amendment purposes, until officer placed him in handcuffs. At that point, having found heroin on his person, officer had probable cause to arrest him. When Defendant told officer that the other Defendant "must have put it there", given totality of circumstance, officer had reasonable suspicion that other Defendant was involved in criminal activity. Thus court erred in granting Defendants' motions to suppress evidence. (CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)
In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his confession to possession of gun that police claimed fell from defendant’s pants, even though defendant claimed that officers had planted gun on him during his arrest and had failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to his confession. Dist. Ct. could properly find that certain police testimony that defendant had been given Miranda warnings prior to his confession was credible and could look to defendant’s criminal history, his lack of credibility with respect to other statements he gave during hearing on suppression motion and his failure to call any supportive witnesses at hearing on motion to suppress when denying motion to suppress. Dist. Ct. also did not err in admitting statistical evidence indicating that it was uncommon to find fingerprint evidence on guns, when such testimony was relevant to explain lack of defendant’s fingerprints on seized gun and to correct misperception about prevalence of fingerprint evidence. Also, prosecutor did not commit reversible error in stating during closing argument that if jury believed officers were lying and had framed defendant then jury should acquit defendant, since such statement did not preclude jury from acquitting defendant on alternative basis.
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely defendant’s habeas petition that had been filed one year and four months after he had been sentenced and judgment had been entered against him on drug charges, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing said petition without conducting evidentiary hearing as to defendant’s claim that limitations period was tolled due to his mental incompetency. Defendant failed to provide details concerning his alleged mental deficiencies and instead presented prison educational document that lacked explanation with respect to defendant’s test scores. Moreover, defendant failed to allege that his mental deficiencies prevented him from filing timely habeas petition and instead alleged that late filing of habeas petition was caused by delay in obtaining appeal decision on his state court sentence that was subject of habeas petition.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1 count of threatening a public official and 3 counts of cyberstalking. Court erred by allowing into evidence 10 letters, read in their entirety, containing references to other crimes and prior bad acts. Although portions of letters had some relevance to issue of identity, abuse of discretion in admitting other portions of letters which contained large amounts of other-crimes evidence. Great risk that jury would find Defendant guilty of charges in light of his propensity, or that it would find Defendant guilty of one of the uncharged acts, so the letters' prejudicial effect overwhelmed their probative value. (JORGENSEN and BURKE, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 3/25/16.) Court erred in imposing public-defender fee of $250 after assistant public defender withdrew, as the exchange between assistant PD and court did not satisfy hearing requirement of Section 113-3.1(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure. A hearing, for the purpose of that Section, requires an inquiry, however slight, into issue of Defendant's ability to pay the PD fee.(JORGENSEN and BIRKETT, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 3/31/16.) Defendant entered negotiated plea of guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender, and was sentenced to 3 years. On remand, Defendant filed pro se postjudgment motion, with court denied. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was aware that charge was predicated on conviction of unlawful restraint, which was not per se a sex offense, and victim's age was not put before the court during that case. It is reasonably probable that had Defendant realized that he could not be properly convicted of violating the Act, he would have forgone entering his plea and would have gone to trial. (SCHOSTOK and JORGENSEN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview/call two potential witnesses on his behalf regarding circumstances surrounding shooting of victim that involved defendant’s presence at scene of crime with two co-defendants. While defendant’s counsel might not have made reasonable strategic decision not to call said witnesses without interviewing them, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had failed to establish any prejudice arising out of counsel’s failure to call said individuals as witnesses, where: (1) one witness’ testimony would only have been cumulative to testimonies of other witnesses that two co-defendants had shot victim and would not have altered state’s case that defendant was accountable for said killing; and (2) second witness’ testimony could not verify defendant’s activities prior to initial shots being fired and did not state that defendant did not have gun at time of shooting.
