Criminal Law

U.S. v. Sanford

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Sanford
Criminal Court
Search and Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2860
Decision Date: 
November 25, 2015
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed and reversed in part and remanded

In prosecution on possession with intent to distribute drugs charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in car in which defendant was passenger, where said car had been initially stopped for speeding violation. Arresting police officer could properly ask for identification from all three individuals in car, especially where no one in car had rented car or was authorized by rental agreement to operate it. Moreover, arresting officer could properly seek drug sniffing dog instead of merely writing ticket and sending group away, where: (1) criminal histories of defendant and another individual indicated that they were members of notorious Gangster Disciples street gang; and (2) defendant and others gave evasive answers as to purpose of their trip. Ct. further noted that eight minute gap between officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and appearance of drug-sniffing dog was not unreasonable.

People v. Holmes

People v. Holmes
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Motions to Suppress
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 141256
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, November 25, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
PALMER

Defendant was arrested when police officer observed a revolver in his waistband.  Police then discovered that Defendant did not have a FOID card, and charged Defendant with 2 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) for carrying a firearm without a valid FOID card. Court properly suppressed the evidence, as the facially invalid AUUW statute is void ab initio, so that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. The void ab initio doctrine applied both to legislative acts that were found unconstitutional for violating substantive constitutional guarantees as well as those adopted in violation of single subject clause. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

People v. Weathers

People v. Weathers
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Postconviction Petitions
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 133264
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, November 25, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
McBRIDE

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first degree murder in 2002 shooting death, and sentenced to 75 years. Court erred in denying his motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition, as his claims of a physically coerced confession have never been reviewed. Defendant attached portions of 2012 Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC) report, which related to detectives that interrogated him, and contended that it was newly discovered evidence as it was not available at the time of his initial postconviction petition in 2009. Defendant established requisite cause, in than an objective factor impeded his ability to raise this claim earlier.  Defendant satisfied prejudice prong as the use of a Defendant's physically coerced confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is never harmless error.(HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

People v. Johnson

People v. Johnson
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (4th) 130968
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, November 24, 2015
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
McLean Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
POPE

Defendant pled guilty to robbery and aggravated battery and sentenced to probation. Defendant was later convicted of theft and criminal trespass to residence after 2 separate jury trials.  Court properly found his convictions for theft and criminal trespass were statutorily required to be consecutively served. Section 5-8-4(c)(1) of Unified Code of Corrections provides that a trial court may impose consecutive sentences where court is of opinion that consecutive sentences are required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the Defendant. (HARRIS and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

People v. Ringland

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Ringland
Criminal Court
Search and Seizure
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
November 25, 2015
Docket Number: 
No. 119484
District: 
3rd Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendants’ motions to quash evidence obtained from traffic stops conducted by State’s Attorney’s special investigator, where defendants alleged that said investigator lacked authority to conduct said traffic stops because appointment of said investigator did not strictly comply with certain procedural requirements set forth in 55 ILCS section 5/3-9005(b). Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s suppression orders, found that section 9005(b) did not authorize State’s Attorney to appoint instant special investigator to assist in instant drug interdiction efforts, where record showed that special investigator was equipped with squad car and ticket books for purposes of patrolling highways.

People v. Wright

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Wright
Criminal Court
Right to Counsel
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
November 25, 2015
Docket Number: 
No. 119561
District: 
1st Dist.

This case presents question as to whether defendant was entitled to new trial on armed robbery charges, where prior to trial court’s acceptance of defendant’s waiver of trial counsel, trial court had incorrectly told defendant that he faced potential 60-year maximum term of incarceration when defendant actually faced 75-year maximum term. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that trial court’s understatement of maximum prison term rendered his waiver of right to counsel unknowing and involuntary. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. noted that defendant had received 50-year sentence and argued that: (1) any understatement of defendant’s maximum penalty did not prejudice or mislead defendant; and (2) record showed that trial court had substantially complied with Rule 401.

People v. Valdez

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Valdez
Criminal Court
Guilty Plea
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
November 25, 2015
Docket Number: 
No. 119860
District: 
3rd Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant-noncitizen’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to burglary charges, even though defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him that he could be deported as result of his plea. Trial court found that while trial counsel’s lack of advise on deportation issue was deficient, it did not entitle defendant to withdraw his guilty plea where trial had admonished defendant during plea colloquy that his plea may have adverse immigration consequences. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted, where: (1) deportation consequences associated with his guilty plea were “truly clear;” and (2) defendant established reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been advised that his guilty plea mandated deportation, where record suggested that he was pleading guilty to avoid deportation. (Dissent filed.)

U.S. v. Coleman

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Coleman
Criminal Court
Guilty Plea
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2246
Decision Date: 
November 24, 2015
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill., Rock Island Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part and remanded

Dist. Ct. did not plainly err in accepting defendant’s guilty plea to drug conspiracy charge, even though Dist. Ct. did not strictly comply with Rule 11 when it failed to expressly discuss during defendant’s plea colloquy collateral attack waiver contained in plea agreement. Record showed that Dist. Ct. covered appellate waiver in plea colloquy, and that defendant indicated during plea colloquy that his attorney explained entire agreement and that he (defendant) understood said agreement. As such, evidence of defendant’s understanding of agreement was adequate substitute for verbal in-court colloquy about collateral-attack waiver. Defendant also failed to show, outside his bare contention, that he would have refused agreement and taken case to trial had he known of collateral attack waiver, especially where defendant faced mandatory life sentence, and instant agreement offered defendant opportunity to receive lower sentence. Defendant, though was entitled to new sentencing hearing where Dist. Ct. failed to justify certain terms of defendant's supervised release.

People v. Williams

People v. Williams
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Jury Selection
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 131103
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, November 24, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HYMAN

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defense counsel did not carry burden of establishing prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection as required by Batson.  Defense counsel's cross-examination of key eyewitness to shooting was not unfairly limited because court reversed its ruling to allow questions about an earlier shooting on the same day and same location.  State proved beyond a reasonable doubt by credible eyewitnesses that Defendant was one of the shooters. The few inconsistencies in eyewitnesses' accounts, individually and together, do not usurp jury's role in resolving questions of fact and credibility of witnesses. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)

U.S. v. Larios-Buentello

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Larios-Buentello
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-1312
Decision Date: 
November 23, 2015
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of illegal re-entry into U.S. after having been removed, even though defendant presented defense under 8 USC section 1326(d) that his original 1998 removal was fundamentally unfair because IJ at that time did not advise him that he would be eligible to seek discretionary relief from removal under section 212(c) of INA. Defendant failed to satisfy all three elements for said defense since: (1) defendant failed to appeal IJ’s removal order, and thus failed to show that he had exhausted any available administrative remedies; (2) defendant failed to show that he had been deprived of any opportunity for judicial review of original removal order; and (3) it was not fundamentally unfair to refrain from advising defendant to seek relief under section 212(c), where such relief would not have been available to defendant in month following his guilty plea.