Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first-degree murder in shooting death of 68-year-old victim during botched robbery attempt. Alleged co-conspirator was shot to death next day. Defendant's own taped interrogation was admitted against him at trial. At trial, defense counsel's arguments as to motion to suppress were broadly worded, but many arguments advanced on appeal had not been argued at trial. Drastic shift in factual theories deprived State of opportunity to present evidence as to them. (FREEMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE, THOMAS, and KILBRIDE, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of harassment in violation of order of protection obtained against him by his girlfriend, whose prior statement was admitted under statutory exception to hearsay that she was "unavailable for cross-examination" at trial. Defendant claimed violation of his 6th amendment right to confrontation. To be admitted, an out-of-court statement must satisfy a hearsay exception and a defendant's sixth amendment rights. Girlfriend persisted in her refusal to testify as to some questions, but did answer preliminary questions at trial and answered some questions about offense of conviction in her statement at trial. Thus, hearsay exception and sixth amendment were satisfied, and her statement was properly admitted. (REYES, concurring; McBRIDE, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder, under accountability theory. Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, drove a car to and from scene where 21-year-old member of gang allegedly shot and killed 15-year-old whom shooter believed associated with a rival gang. Court erred in third-stage denial of Defendant's postconviction petition. It is beyond reasonable dispute that Defendant made substantial showing of a constitutional violation, as State failed to disclose field notes of an investigating officer. If defense had been given access to notes prior to trial, it could have impeached officer on central issue of Defendant's foreknowledge of gun used in the offense. Defendant's knowledge of the gun was critical to State's shared-intent theory of accountability.(McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted first degree murder of police officer and aggravated battery of another police officer. Court's failure to instruct jury on State's burden to disprove Defendant's justification for his use of force in self-defense was plain error. Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding after in camera inspection that confidential records of complaints against the arresting police officers were not admissible at trial or subject to disclosure. Court used proper review procedure and did not err in its decision as to remoteness and irrelevancy of information in OPS (Office of Professional Standards) files. As to 9 files of both officers that were not too remote in time, allegations of misconduct were completely distinct from present case, and all claims were unfounded or not sustained by sufficient evidence.(REYES and PALMER, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery for beating his brother-in-law. Defendant forfeited review of errors he claimed had deprived him of a fair trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised in postconviction proceedings where a better record can be made. Court conducted adequate Krankel inquiry into his pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Sentence of 15 years was not excessive; Defendant committed offense while on parole, and had several prior criminal convictions, and was to be sentenced as Class X offender based on prior record. (TURNER and STEIGMANN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder. Court properly dismissed Defendant’s pro se postconviction petition at second stage, as Defendant failed to make showing of culpable negligence to excuse his late filing of his petition. Defendant had 35 days after judgment on direct appeal to file petition for leave to appeal and 6 months from that point to file his postconviction petition. (JORGENSEN and SPENCE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon and one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). State failed to establish that Defendant had exclusive and immediate control of area where contraband was recovered. Defendant was seen jumping out of window of house where contraband was recovered, but no proof that Defendant had immediate control over basement rafters in house, or of living room where bullets were found in desk drawer. Officer did not see Defendant handle contraband or discard anything while emerging through the window. Mail addressed to Defendant at that address, and men’s clothing located in bedroom, were insufficient proof of immediate and exclusive control of those areas. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for repeatedly punching 4-year-old boy in the stomach, causing bruising to an organ in his abdomen. Although court erred in granting State's noncompliant motion to substitute judge, which was untimely filed and did not allege judge was prejudiced, error was harmless as Defendant made no showing of prejudice. Court properly found child victim competent to testify; child's testimony did not establish that he was disqualified to be a witness under Section 115-14(b) of Code of Criminal Procedure.(McDADE, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery of a peace officer and resisting a peace officer resulting in injury. Court properly allowed video of incident to be played in the courtroom during deliberations, as video equipment was not available in jury room; video had viewed video twice during trial, and no presumption that third viewing was prejudicial. Evidence was sufficient to support convictions. Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel; decision to not have Defendant testify was matter of trial strategy. (WRIGHT, concurring; McDADE, disenting.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s guilty verdict on bank fraud and money laundering charges stemming from defendant’s deposit of $344,657.84 altered check and subsequent withdrawals of $171,000 from bank. While defendant argued that record failed to contain evidence that he knew check had been altered, jury could find that defendant knowingly deposited fraudulent check, where: (1) check was deposited via ATM machine instead of bank teller; (2) defendant made several withdrawals totaling $171,000 from different bank branches within 5-day period; and (3) defendant indicated that he was only expecting $45,000 check and yet received and cashed check for almost $350,000. Moreover, jury could look to defendant’s conduct after deposit of check to establish his knowledge about fraudulent scheme to cash bogus check. Fact that jury instruction did not define term “scheme” did not constitute plain error, where jury was informed that it was required to find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant made misrepresentation, and that scheme involved materially false or fraudulent promise. Ct., though, vacated four counts of bank fraud charges, where they were based only on subsequent withdrawals from defendant’s bank account, since bank fraud charge was completed when bank released entire funds from check to defendant’s account, and subsequent withdrawals were dependent on initial release of funds.
