Criminal Law

Police stopped Defendant for running red light, then officer returned to his police car and returned to squad car to check status of his drivers license and learned of active investigative alert for Defendant involving a homicide.  Defendant was then placed in back seat of squad car, and another officer, looking through backseat window, saw brick of cocaine in back seat. That officer, without permission, then entered Defendant's car and retrieved cocaine. Search of Defendant's vehicle was not a valid search incident to arrest, as Defendant was not in custody, and thus officer had no grounds for securing Defendant's car.  Discovery of cocaine stems directly from Defendant's improper detention and thus was properly suppressed. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/8/15.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of armed robbery, 2 counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, and 1 count of aggravated battery with a firearm, and sentenced to aggregate term of 43 years. Defendant pointed a gun at pizza delivery driver, and told him not to move; and shot driver's teenage niece, hitting her in the thigh. Evidence does not support conviction for attempted armed robbery, as Defendant never demanded pizza or other property, and thus actions were not a substantial step toward armed robbery. Under one-act, one-crime doctrine, Defendant cannot be convicted of both armed robbery of niece and attempted armed robbery of driver where there was only one attempt to take pizza from niece. Under same rule, Defendant's single act of firing at niece cannot be basis for multiple convictions, and sentence should be imposed on more serious offense.  Thus, convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm are vacated. State's participation in preliminary Krankel inquiry created adversarial situation requiring reversal in claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.(PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 5 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and 5 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and sentenced to 5 terms of natural life. Some offenses occurred when Defendant was a minor; victims were Defendant's minor sisters and half-sisters.  Court properly admitted testimony on other crimes, as they were proximate in time, within 2 years of charged offenses, similar physical acts, and probative value of other-crimes evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.  Court erred in sentencing Defendant to natural life on counts committed when Defendant was a minor, and on counts which each involved only one victim. Thus, those mandatory natural-life sentences violate 8th-Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.(POPE and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and robbery.  State proved Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder; autopsy showed that victim suffered at least 6 blunt force trauma blows to his face consistent with strikes from a fist.Jury could reasonably have concluded that sometime during his violent encounter with victim, who was frail and small, kn ew that blows he inflicted on victim created strong probability of death or great bodily harm; no specialized physiological knowledge was required to know that. Court's failure to instruct jury that IPI Criminal 7.15 also applied to involuntary manslaughter was not error. No error in admitting Defendant's statements, made in police interview, as to his criminal history, illicit drug use, and "going to jail all his life", as they were not used to argue propensity to commit crimes. (KNECHT and APPLETON, concurring.)

State charged minor, then age 17, with reckless discharge of a firearm, 2 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Minor sustained gunshot wounds to his foot and was taken to a hospital. Police officer testified that minor told him he was holding a gun and shot himself while running away from 2 men he thought were going to rob him.  Minor denies that he shot himself, and says that 1 or both men shot him. State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that minor possessed a firearm, and thus could not prove he committed the 3 offenses charged. State offered no eyewitnesses to shooting or any evidence that minor was in possession of gun when he injured his foot.(NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)

Court erred in dismissing traffic charges "for failure to proosecute" when, after Court waited for 15 minutes, State failed to appear at pretrial conference. Absent statutory authorization, or in case where court has an inherent authority to dismiss indictment where there has been a clear denial of due process, a trial court has no power before trial to dismiss criminal charges on its own motion or on motion of the defendant.(HARRIS and POPE, concurring.)

A charging instrument that identifies the victim of a nonsexual offense only as "a minor" is insufficient pursuant to Section 111-3 of Code of Criminal Procedure.  Courts properly dismissed criminal complaints based on insufficiency of those charging instruments.Under Section 111-3, State was required to identify the victims, and as State failed to amend charging instruments, and refused to identify victims by their names, initials, or any description of than "a minor", to strictly comply with Section 111-3 prior to trial, courts properly dismissed them. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant, at 19 at time of offense, was convicted of first-degree murder of his father and a woman who was drinking alcohol with his father. Defendant filed Section 2-1401 petition 17 years after his conviction, alleging that circuit court violated his right to due process by failing to appoint capital-qualified attorneys, rendering his convictions void, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.  A criminal defendant may not raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence for the first time on appeal from circuit court's dismissal of a petition for relief from final judgment under Section 2-1401 of Code of Civil Procedure. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.) 

Defendant, who was serving 20-year prison sentence (with 25-year firearm enhancement), mailed a "Motion to Vacate Judgment" arguing that enhancement was void because court only found him guilty of murder.  Appellate court erred in remanding, finding trial court's dismissal was premature as State had not been served.  Record does not affirmatively demonstrate there was deficient service.  The absence of a certified mail receipt in record does not affirmatively establish that service by certified mail was not accomplished. Any section 2-1401 petitioner who seeks to use, on appeal, his own error by way of allegedly defective service, in effort to gain reversal of a sua sponte dismissal of petition on the merits, must affirmatively demonstrate error via proceedings of record. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) of the Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon (AUUW) statute does not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, or the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions. The location element in Section 24-1.6(a)(1) remains a viable element of the AUUW statute when combined with subsection (a)(3)(C).(GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)