Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated battery. State's use of peremptory challenges did not evince a discriminatory purpose, as potential jurors who were stricken all made comments which indicated they might not be impartial. As hearing on posttrial motion occurred more than three months after jury selection, prosecutor's lack of recall as to specific reason for striking potential juror does not establish that her stated reason was pretextual. Court's finding that State established a valid and race-neutral reason to exclude potential juror is not clearly erroneous. (SCHOSTOK and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as his attorney filed a Supreme Court Rule 604(d) certificate that was defective on its face. Certificate incorrectly refers to Defendant with pronoun "her", and states that he made amendments to pleadings, yet he later admitted that he had not done so. Certificate does not specify that counsel examined report of proceedings of guilty plea.(STEWART and SCHWARM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of four counts of home invasion and aggravated kidnapping, and sentenced to natural life in prison. Three of Defendant's four convictions for home invasion are vacated, pursuant to one-act, one crime rule. Defendant's 2003 armed robbery sentence, which did not include firearm sentencing enhancement, is not void as he was properly sentenced without enhancement four years before ligislature cured proportionate penalties clause violation. Defendant's first Class X felony conviction (armed robbery) occurred when he was 17, but his second Class X (armed robbery) conviction occurred five years later. Natural life sentence was properly imposed, and is not unconstitutional. Defendant's adjudication as armed habitual offender, of which he had fair and ample warning, punished him for new and separate crime he committed as an adult after two prior Class X felonies. (HALL and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of burglary after jury trial. Preindictment delay was due to defense counsel's numerous requests for continuances; thus, no error in 79-day delay of indictment. Public defender fee vacated, as court failed to conduct hearing on Defendant's financial resources, to determine his ability to pay public defender fee. (McLAREN and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with armed robbery, and was convicted, after jury trial, of robbery of candy store. Evidence showed that Defendant grappled with cashier when he took money from cash register and thus used "force" sufficient to convict him of offense of robbery. Court did not err in sua sponte instructing jury as to lesser-included offense of robbery. No ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel's failure to define force, as no pattern jury instruction defines force, and outcome of trial would likely not have changed even if force was defined. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of multiple sex assault offenses as to his minor stepdaughter. Subsequent reversal of Defendant's underlying prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his prior girlfriend's minor daughter which was admitted to show propensity requires reversal and a new trial. Resulting injustice in present case was not harmless. Reversal of underlying case was "new evidence" in that conviction was in good standing at time of present trial. (SCHMIDT, specially concurring; LYTTON, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of delivery of less than one gram of cocaine, and he was sentenced to 7 years. Court erred in ordering reimbursement for public defender's service when Defendant was not given notice of hearing and was not allowed to present evidence as to his ability to pay. Court's actions in pronouncing amount to be paid to PD was "some sort of a hearing", but did not meet due process requirements. Case remanded for proper hearing on reimbursement. (O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 3/5/15.) Defendant pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to 36 years. Court erred in conducting a hearing on Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first, sua sponte,ordering a fitness hearing, because reports of Defendant's DOC mental health treatment and unfitness determinations raised a bona fide doubt of Defendant's fitness.(O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of forgery, for letter of diminished capacity purportedly written by treating psychologist. Letter was provided to financial adviser to facilitate transfer of assets from trust of Defendant's father to Defendant's mother. Defendant admitted to psychologist, who had refused to write such letter, that she had written the letter with his signature. Evidence was sufficient to show that a reasonable person might be deceived into accepting the document as genuine; letter was presented with the name of psychologist who had evaluated Defendant's father, and it was on letterhead from nursing home where he had stayed. Although document was rejected by financial adviser, it had the potential to have a legal effect. Intent to defraud can exist even though funds are sought on behalf of another person. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)