Criminal Law

Defendant appealed second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition, claiming that his privately retained postconviction counsel failed to provide him reasonable assistance with his petition because he failed to contest the State's assertion that the untimely filing of his petition was due to his culpable negligence. Although a pro se defendant had a right to reasonable assistance from appointed counsel, State is not required to provide reasonable assistance of counsel for any petitioner able to hire his own postconviction counsel, and thus Defendant failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Here, private counsel's performance was not so deficient that he failed to provide reasonable level of assistance, and his argument appears to have been the best option available.(HYMAN, concurring; PUCINSKI, dissenting.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 2/10/15.) Trial court and State appeared to be confused as to status of Defendant's prior motions and court's disposing of them, in making decision to deny Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Case remanded for new hearing, returning to trial court as it existed when Defendant was initially sentenced for reckless homicide and DUI (cannabis). Defendant to be granted reasonable time to file new motion to withdraw guilty plea and/or reconsider sentence, if counsel determines new motion is needed. (BURKE and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder under theory of accountability; and after simultaneous bench trial outside presence of jury, was also convicted of being armed habitual criminal. State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a common criminal design between Defendant and the victim's killer, to establish Defendant's intent to promote or facilitate the crime. Thus, evidence was insufficient to convict Defendant of murder under accountability theory. Because Defendant's prior conviction for AUUW (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon) was based on statute found unconstitutional and void ab initio in People v. Aguilar case, it cannot stand as predicate offense for Defendant's armed habitual criminal conviction. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial in absentia, of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Court properly summary dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. Claim of entrapment is forfeited as he did not raise it at trial, and also as that defense is unavailable to a defendant who denies committing the offense. Actual-innocence claim was meritless; basis for entrapment defense did not remain undiscovered until after trial. No ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as Defendant's presence at trial was required for counsel to decide whether to submit instruction on lesser charge.(McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Illinois Supreme Court held, in 2012 People v. White decision, that when factual basis for plea agreement accepted by circuit court establishes that the defendant is subject to mandatory sentencing enhancement, court must impose it even if agreement included condition that State would not pursue enhancement. As that decision established a new rule within the meaning of U.S. Supreme Court's 2989 Teague v. Lane decision, which does not fall within either of the Teague exceptions, it does not apply retroactively to convictions which were final at time People v. White case was decided. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 12 counts of first-degree murder, and attempted first-degree murder, 4 counts of home invasion, and residential burglary. Court properly determined that State did not commit a Batson violation in jury selection. Defense counsel objected to State's question of potential juror, who was black, about her "faith", and State exercised peremptory challenge as it believed that it could not question her further about subject. Court did not improperly admonish Defendant that if he waived his right to counsel that he would not be able to have counsel reappointed in middle of trial, and court did not intimidate Defendant into foregoing his right to self-representation. Court erred in convicting Defendant of 12 counts of murder, as two persons were murdered; and court erred in convicting on 4 counts of home invasion as convictions were based on Defendant's single entry into home of victims. As convictions of residential burglary and home invasion were based on same conduct, conviction for residential burglary is vacated. (HUTCHINSON and BURKE, concurring.)