Criminal Law

Police officer took bottled of pills from Defendant, when responding to call for domestic disturbance. While in police car, Defendant removed handcuffs, grabbed bottle of pills which officer had taken, and swallowed them. Defendant was charged with obstruction of justice. Evidence supporting Defendant's charged offense was not the fruit of the purportedly unconstitutional police conduct, and thus exclusionary rule did not apply. (ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and sentenced to 60 years. Defendant did not raise issue of self-defense at trial and State was not obliged to disprove that affirmative defense. Trial court properly refused self-defense instructions based on insufficient evidence. Court did not err in allowing State to introduce evidence and present argument that Defendant was hiding from the police. A jury could validly infer from evidence that Defendant knew he was a suspect and that he consciously avoided the police. Court conducted a Krankel inquiry, permitting Defendant opportunity to present each point raised in his pro se motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, followed by brief discussion between court and defense counsel as to conduct, and concluding with court's observation of defense counsel's performance at trial. Court's finding of no ineffectiveness of counsel was not manifestly erroneous. (PALMER and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm, and sentenced to 36-month term of probation. Court then held hearing on revocation of probation Court ejected three spectators from revocation hearing, after prosecutor complained that spectators had followed citizen witnesses from courthouse. Whether there is a constitutional right to a public hearing on probation revocation hearing is not sufficiently settled to permit review under plain-error rule. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)

Court entered order requiring Defendant, who had been convicted of theft and financial exploitation of an elderly or disabled person, to make monthly restitution payments over a five-year period. Defendant remained obligated to make full restitution. Court later reduced amount of monthly installment payments, but did not extend period during which payments were due. Order did not become unenforceable as to unpaid amounts that became due during the five-year period. (JORGENSEN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 3 separate felonies (driving while license revoked, unlawful use of a credit card, and escape), and held in simultaneous custody on all 3 cases. State elected to prosecute driving-on-revoked charge first, but failed to bring any case to trial within 120 days from date Defendant was placed in custody. Thus, Defendant's statutory right to speedy trial was violated, and court properly dismissed charges with prejudice. Commencement of trial, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial, on at least one pending charge, and not mere election of which charge to be tried first, that provides additional time to try unelected charges. (GOLDENHERSH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Under plain language of AUUW statute, a person may only be sentenced under subsection (d)(2) if the factors constituting the AUUW offenses identified in both subsections (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C) are present., but because the former subsection has been found unconstitutional, the requirements for sentences cannot be met. Thus, subsection (2) of sentencing subsection (d) of AUUW statute is invalid; but it is not such an interdependent and essential part of statute that its severance requires rest of statute to fail. Trial court properly vacated Defendant's Class 4 convictions of AUUW, as offenses charged are based on Sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A), which are unconstitutional. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested in a liquor store, found to have an uncased and loaded .38-caliber handgun in his waistband.Defendant's conviction and sentence for Unlawful Use of a Weapon (UUW) by a felon, based on Defendant's possession of firearm ammunition, is reinstated. Defendant was properly convicted of armed habitual criminal based on his possession of a firearm and UUW by a felon based on his possession of firearm ammunition. Underlying incident, where police officers arrived at liquor store in squad car, in plain clothes but with badges visible, and then Defendant entered store, was a consensual encounter, as it was not coercive or unusual. No Fourth Amendment violation when officer searched Defendant for weapon after Defendant told him that he was armed. That UUW by a felon statute does not expressly distinguish between loaded and unloaded firearms does not render statute ambiguous. Statute authorizes separate convictions for simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition in a single loaded firearm. Separate convictions do not violate one-act, one-crime rule. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Respondent, age 16, was charged under Juvenile Court Act with three counts of Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon (AUUW) statute and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Aguilar case, that age-based restrictions on right to keep and bear arms are historically rooted, applies equally to persons under age 21. Charges based on Class 4 form of Section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of AUUW statute are dismissed as facially unconstitutional per Aguilar decision. Sections 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) and (a)(3)(I) of AUUW statute are constitutional and severable from unconstitutional provision of statute.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)