Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 90-year term of incarceration, after defendant had pleaded guilty to six related counts of sexually exploiting child, where charges stemmed from defendant’s use of his iPhone to film himself sexually molesting three of his male karate students. While defendant argued that instant sentence was substantively unreasonable, and that 25-year sentence was reasonable given his poor upbringing, defendant failed to overcome presumptive reasonableness of instant within-guideline range sentence. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could have properly focused on extremely serious nature of defendant's crime, vulnerability of instant grade school age victims, and need to protect public from dangerous child molester.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 12-year term of incarceration on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, where record showed that defendant qualified for 15-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Dist. Ct. lacked authority to impose sentence lower than 15 years that was mandated by ACCA, and Dist. Ct. could not ignore one of defendant’s three prior qualifying convictions for ACCA treatment, in order to impose sentence that was lower than instant statutory minimum.

In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to continue his trial in order to obtain new counsel, where said motion was considered on day prior to start of trial. While last-minute nature of defendant’s continuance request was insufficient by itself to deny said request, Dist. Ct. properly could consider last-minute nature of request, along with fact that any continuance would have caused inconvenience to 34 jurors who were told to report for jury duty, as well as to court personnel and witnesses. Moreover, defendant failed to establish that proposed new counsel would have actually accepted case or would have been able to be prepared for trial within time frame set forth in continuance motion.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charges of harboring illegal aliens in scheme to use said aliens in prostitution ring, where: (1) term “harboring” required showing that defendant provided shelter to illegal aliens in place where authorities were unlikely to find them; and (2) record established requisite harboring activities where defendant had confiscated all of said aliens’ identifying documents, forced them to live and commit prostitution under assumed name in controlled environment and prohibited them from communicating with anyone outside his control. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that he took actions that heightened risk that aliens would have been detected by immigration authorities. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that record did not support interstate element of his Hobbs Act convictions, where defendant used Internet and long-distance telephone calls to extort money and maintain control over said illegal aliens.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress rifle found in plain view in defendant’s basement during execution of arrest warrant. While defendant argued that instant seizure was improper because it had occurred after defendant had been arrested on first floor of his home, seizure was proper, where rifle was discovered during protective sweep of defendant’s home. Fact that rifle was in locked basement did to require different result. Ct. also did not err in admitting certain evidence of defendant’s uncharged drug dealing/possession, where defendant had contested issue of his possession of rifle, and where such evidence was relevant on issue of defendant’s motive to possess instant rifle, which govt. claimed was used to support his drug dealing activities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his honest-services mail fraud indictment arising out of alleged kickback scheme in which defendant paid physicians to refer patients to defendant’s outpatient surgery centers, even though govt. failed to allege any sort of tangible harm to patients in form of physical or monetary harm arising out of said referrals. Actual or intended tangible harm to victim is not element of offense of honest-services mail fraud. Moreover, although govt. conceded that no physical or monetary harm occurred to instant patients, intangible harm from fraud can be quite substantial in doctor/patient relationships, where patients depend on their doctors to provide them with honest medical services in their best interests.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor’s comments during defendant’s sentencing hearing that urged Dist. Ct. to sentence defendant to 20-year term, where prosecutor failed to apprise Dist. Ct. of prosecutor’s recommendation in plea agreement that defendant receive 5-to-7 year term of confinement, with balance of 20-year term being served in extended supervision. Defendant could not establish any prejudice, where his counsel alerted Dist. Ct. to relevant terms of plea agreement, and where Dist. Ct.’s sentencing explanation supported conclusion that there was no likelihood that defendant would have received recommended 5-to-7 years’ confinement had prosecutor alerted Dist. Ct. to said recommendation in plea agreement. Moreover, although Dist. Ct. sentenced defendant to 34-year term of confinement, as well as ten year term of extended supervision, prosecutor’s arguments that focused on aggravated sentencing factors did not undermine bargained-for recommendation contained in plea bargain given perceived need to protect public and victim from defendant.

In prosecution on charge of conspiracy to manufacture of methamphetamine and unlawful possession of pseudoephedrine pills, Dist. Ct. erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior and uncharged possession of methamphetamine. While govt. argued that admission of such “bad acts” evidence was permissible on issue of defendant’s intent to use pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine as well as his knowledge of process for making methamphetamine involved in current charge, Ct. of Appeals found that such evidence was improper under Rule 404(b)(1) because govt.’s argument relied on propensity inference that defendant’s history of involvement with uncharged methamphetamine manufacturing made it more likely that he intended to use pseudoephedrine pills alleged in current charge to make methamphetamine. Error, though, was harmless, where other witnesses testified that they supplied pseudoephedrine pills to defendant for purposes of making methamphetamine during relevant time frame.