Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of first-degree murder, and sentenced to 84 years and 3 years MSR. Defendant and his brother, in gang-related crime, set fire to a home, killing a boy and seriously injuring family members. Court properly denied postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit, as allegations are directly contradicted by the record and Defendant cannot establish prejudice by any failure of counsel to communicate off the record State’s offer of 20-60 years, as any error was clearly remedied by numerous on-record explanations of offer. Defense counsel's decisions to not object during State's remarks at sentencing hearing, and to not present all possible witnesses at trial due to language barrier, were matters of trial strategy and thus not ineffective assistance of counsel. (SCHOSTOK and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Court entered summary dismissal of pro se postconviction petition. Because Defendant was subject to improper double enhancement at sentencing, as a prior conviction was used both as element of instant offense and to find him eligible for Class X sentence, his sentence is void, and this issue may be raised at any time. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 15, was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, after sexually assaulting 25-year-old staff member of residential facility who was driving him home from family visit. Pursuant to Illinois automatic transfer statute, case was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, where Defendant was tried as an adult, convicted on all counts, and sentenced to 36 years. Appellate court reversed. Appellate court erred in excluding Defendant's confession, as police made reasonable attempt to notify a proper person, as required by statute. Statute does not require actual notice prior to start of police questioning, and does not require presence of a concerned adult at questioning. Victim's sexual history was not admissible on remand under "constitutional necessity" exception to state rape shield statute, due to inadequacy of original defense offer of proof. Automatic transfer statute is not unconstitutional. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring; THEIS, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated batter and felony murder of her 3 1/2 year old daughter; appellate court affirmed; Illinois Supreme Court reversed conviction without remand, finding evidence was insufficient to support inference that Defendant knew, prior to daughter's death, that her paramour was abusing the child. Trial court properly denied Defendant's petition for certificate of innocence, as Defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that she was actually innocent of charges filed against her. There was ample circumstantial evidence that Defendant knew there was substantial risk of serious harm yet took no action to protect child from future injury by abuser. "Not guilty" is not the legal equivalent of "innocent." (LYTTON, specially concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 10/2/14.) Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress, as investigatory stop leading to arrest was proper, and defense failed to shift burden to State. Information relied upon by police stemmed from various sources armed with incriminating facts; Defendant had history of domestic violence toward murder victim and had sent her threatening text messages; seizure of his vehicle was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion. Length of custodial interview was extended because Defendant's version of events continued to change, and thus duration of his interview does not render his statements involuntary or unreliable. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery, for allegedly pressing his thumbs into the eye sockets of his uncle, age 63, during a fight; Defendant prevented uncle from using phone to call for aid. Uncle was severely injured, and had to have one eye removed and lost most of his vision in the other eye. Defendant was sentenced to 14 years. Rational trier of fact could have found that aggravated domestic battery was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Extent of great bodily harm or permanent disability inflicted was far beyond that necessary for conviction for aggravated domestic battery. Court did not consider improper factor in sentencing, even though court made a specific comment about permanent nature of injuries. Court within its discretion in sentencing Defendant to maximum extended-term sentence available, given Defendant's prior criminal history and extent of injury to victim. (O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was indicted form armed robbery, and court accepted negotiated guilty plea, and sentenced Defendant to 10 years. Court properly dismissed his postconviction petition as it was substantively frivolous and patently without merit.Factual basis for plea reflects that codefendant would have testified to Defendant's participation in crime, and without plea, Defendant would have faced two separate burglary charges dismissed as part of plea agreement. Defendant's allegation of coerced guilty plea is contradicted by Defendant's statement, at plea hearing, that no one coerced him. (SCHOSTOK and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and possession of firearm with defaced identification marks. The UUWF statute is valid exercise of Illinois' right to protect its citizens from potential danger of possession of firearms by convicted felons. UUWF statute is not unconstitutional under second amendment, and does not violate due process or equal protection. (PALMER and REYES, concurring.)

Where evidence supported, and trial court gave, a self-defense instruction, court must give a second-degree-murder instruction if requested by Defendant. Evidence existed to support Defendant's version of events, and it is reasonably arguable that Defendant was prejudiced when second-degree murder instruction was not tendered. Thus, Defendant's postconviction petition presented the gist of a constitutional claim, and court erred in dismissing petition at first stage as frivolous and patently without merit. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, aft jury trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and sentenced to 10 years. A conviction for UUW or AUUW which is unconstitutional under Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Aguilar is void ab initio and cannot serve as elemental predicate felony for UUWF. Only facial unconstitutionality renders a statute void ab initio. Defendant's AUUW conviction for Class 4 felony form of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) or (a)(2), (a)(3)(A) is void ab initio and thus cannot serve as an essential element of his UUWF conviction.(PALMER and GORDON, concurring.)