Criminal Law

Jury entered verdict finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent, who had been in civil confinement as a sexually dangerous person for 12 years, was still a sexually dangerous person. Court instructed jury to presume that Respondent had recovered, and that this presumption was to prevail unless State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was still a sexually dangerous person. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, after he brutally beat his wife upon learning that she had been having an affair with a former co-worker. Court properly refused second-degree murder instruction, as he did not find wife engaged in the act of adultery, but learned of it from viewing sexually explicit text messages and photos exchanged with her lover. Provocation by mutual combat did not occur, as Defendant's actions during fight was out of proportion to the provocation, and Defendant initiated the fight. Court properly refused involuntary manslaughter instruction, as given Defendant's much greater size and strength, and nature of victim's injuries, Defendant did not act recklessly. (LAVIN and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of one count of involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member, in death of his wife, who had a history of mental health issues. Defendant had laid on top of victim while she was face down, and he restrained her wrists, and forensic pathologist testified that victim died of traumatic asphyxia during physical restraint. It was function of jury to resolve conflicts in expert testimony; defense expert testified that victim died of natural causes. Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice by cremation of victim's body a few days after autopsy; defense expert testified that victim's body would not have exonerated Defendant.(BURKE and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder under theory of accountability, and sentenced to 55 years. Defendant instructed his employee to kill Defendant's ex-stepfather,with whom Defendant lived; employee killed victim with multiple gunshots. Court properly considered and listed factors in mitigation and aggravation, and court focused on premeditated nature of plan to kill victim. Court placed insignificant weight to fact that Defendant's conduct caused serious harm and did not result in a greater sentence. Shooter was sentenced to 45 years, and it was expected that Defendant would receive longer sentence as he masterminded murder.(CHAPMAN and STEWART, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempt, and home invasion. Court summarily dismissed his pro se postconviction petition. Judgment vacated in part and remanded for the trial court, and not the circuit clerk, to impose mandatory fines. Late fees and collection fees vacated, as many fines were not judicially imposed, and as several assessments were imposed improperly on multiple counts. Sex-offender fine can be properly imposed on each count in a defendant's case, where a defendant is found guilty of and sentenced for multiple sex offenses in a single case. (KNECHT and HARRIS, concurring.)

After bench trial, court found Respondent to be a sexually violent person per Sexually Violent Persons (SVP) Commitment Act, and committed Respondent to a secure facility for treatment. Respondent orally made demand for jury trial on same day that State withdrew its demand for jury trial. SVP Act provides adequate instructions on topic of jury demands, so that Section 2-1105(a) of Code of Civil Procedure does not apply. SVP Act requires that a respondent make a jury demand within 10 days of probable-cause hearing, and Act does not provide that a withdrawal of jury demand by one party reactivates the other party's opportunity to demand jury trial. (McLAREN and SPENCE, concurring.)

When court summarily dismisses postconviction petition at first stage, Section 122-2.1(a) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires that court enter its final written judgment order, specifying findings of fact and conclusions of law, within 90 days after petition is filed and docketed. A written judgment order is "entered" when it is entered of record, by clerk filing and docketing it, not when judge signs it. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)