Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence of cannabis and was placed on 12 months’ supervision. Defendant appealed and argued that his sentence should be reversed because he was improperly prosecuted for a Vehicle Code violation by the plaintiff without a showing on the record of written permission to prosecute from the state’s attorney and that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant had forfeited the issue of permission and had not established clear or obvious error for the purposes of plain error review and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. (McLAREN and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and home invasion and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 48 years and 25 years. On direct appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the home invasion conviction and argued that his sentence for murder was excessive because it did not take into account defendant’s youth, his supportive family, his mental health and substance abuse issues, and his rehabilitative potential. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered the victim’s home without authority and that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s sentencing decision. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring)

Defendant, who was found guilty of first-degree murder, appealed from the trial court’s second stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Defendant argued in his petition that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defendant was tried in a joint trial with a co-defendant. The appellate court affirmed, noting that counsel was not ineffective because counsel filed a motion to sever and raised the issue in a post-trial motion for a new trial. The appellate court further concluded that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s severance motion was not grounds for a new trial. Defendant also argued that his conviction was based on witness statements procured through police intimidation or coercion in violation of his due process rights, but the appellate court rejected this argument as lacking persuasiveness. The appellate court further rejected defendant’s arguments regarding actual innocence and a challenge to the length of his sentence. (HYMAN and TAILOR, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s denial of sentencing credit for his completion of behavior modification and substance abuse programs and a county jail work assessment. Defendant argued on appeal that the educational programs were of a sufficient length and duration to entitle defendant to sentencing credit and that the trial court erred in finding that sentencing credit for work assignments could only be granted to prisoners in the department of corrections and not to inmates in the county jail. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in failing to award defendant additional credit for completion of educational programs because he had not presented sufficient evidence of his participation in those programs and that the language of the statute pertaining to work assignment credit clearly established that the legislature did not intend for work assessment credit to include those individuals being held in pretrial custody. (HOLDRIDGE and HETTEL, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of three counts of home invasion with a dangerous weapon and three counts of home invasion causing injury. The trial court merged the six counts of home invasion into one and sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison. The trial court also found that the 20 year sentence was required to be consecutive to five year concurrent sentences imposed in a separate case arising out of the same incident. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence on an element of the offense was impeached, that the trial court erred in imposing mandatory consecutive sentences where the record did not support a finding of severe bodily injury, and that the imposition of an aggregate 25-year sentence was improper where it amounted to a life sentence and where the trial court did not properly balance the aggravating and mitigating factors. The appellate court affirmed, finding that evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct caused severe bodily injury, and that the trial court did not err in sentencing. (WELCH and CATES, concurring)

The State appealed from a trial court order granting defendant pretrial release, arguing that the trial court applied the incorrect definition for a forcible felony. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred when it interpreted the residual forcible felony clause to require the State to prove that defendant contemplated and was willing to use force necessary to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. The appellate court further explained that under its interpretation a forcible felony occurs only when the circumstances of a particular case show that the defendant actually threatened or inflicted great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement. (BARBERIS and BOIE, concurring)

Respondent appealed from an order of the trial court finding that he remained a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The appellate court affirmed, finding that even though the expert testimony was conflicting it was the role of the trial court to resolve the conflict and the denial of respondent's petition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was not clearly apparent that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person based on the evidence. The appellate court also rejected a request to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that it had jurisdiction to decide the appeal because respondent appealed the result of his discharge proceeding within 30 days of the trial court’s decision. (HOLDRIDGE and BRENNAN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful delivery of a firearm and sentenced to 18 months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, by denying his motion for directed finding, by finding him guilty at the close of the trial, and by rejecting his post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment because the indictment properly used statutory language to describe the prohibited conduct and, as a result, stated the nature of the charged offense and, further, that the statute the indictment was based on was not unconstitutionally vague. The appellate court also concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a directed finding of not guilty at the close of the State’s case and that the trial court did not err by finding defendant guilty at the end of the trial because there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the offense. Finally, the appellate court held that the trial court did not err when it rejected defendant’s post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (DOHERTY and LANNERD, concurring)