Criminal Law

Defendant was sentenced after pleading guilty to indecent solicitation of a child. Petition for violation of probation tolled period of probation, for several years due to filing of supplemental petitions for violation of probation. Court had discretion to modify probation by extending its length to allow him time to participate in sex-offender treatment sessions. Court must make on-the-record finding as to Defendant’s criminal history at probation-revocation proceeding, with agreement of specific sentence, in order to waive pre-sentence investigation report requirement. (ROCHFORD and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of second-degree murder. Defendant filed postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which court denied as frivolous. Defendant then filed motion to amend his petition, with proposed amended petition attached which expanded on claims of original petition. Court should have considered proposed amended petition as adjunct to motion for leave to amend, rather than a motion to reconsider or motion to file successive petition. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of solicitation of murder for hire of two of State’s witnesses in his criminal case for unlawful possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver. By failing to file notice of appeal or motion directed against order within 30 days, Defendant deprived appellate court of jurisdiction to consider whether initial postconviction petition was a petition under Post-Conviction Petition or Section 2-1401 Petition for Relief from Judgment. Defendant’s amended petition did not identify any objective factors impeding his ability to raise his new claims in his initial petition. Thus, Defendant failed to meet cause prong of cause-and-prejudice requirement to file successive postconviction petition. (ZENOFF, concurring; SCHOSTOK, specially concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty and was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Conviction must be vacated because it is void, as section of AUUW statute under which Defendant was convicted is facially unconstitutional and thus void ab initio. As underlying conviction is void, order of probation based on conviction was void and two-year prison sentence imposed after revocation of probation is void. (PUCINSKI and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Conviction for AUUW is void as AUUW statute is facially unconstitutional, as it violates the second amendment. Defendant’s status as a felon does not render conviction under the charged section of AUUW statute. Before court orders Defendant to pay for services of court-appointed counsel, court must give notice to Defendant, and give opportunity to be heard at hearing on ability to pay. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

In a stipulated bench trial, court should elicit from Defendant that he is presenting and preserving a defense and that he is not stipulating that evidence is sufficient to convict, as failure to establish either factor renders trial tantamount to a guilty plea, and the issue sought to be preserved is foreclosed. When a defendant’s stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, the defendant has thereby waive all nonjurisdictional issues. (SPOMER and CATES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon for carrying weapon without valid FOID card, and offense was elevated to Class X felony as he wore body armor. Officer’s testimony about bulletproof vest Defendant had been found wearing was properly admitted as lay opinion, as it was based on his personal observations and was of type officer was generally capable of making. No specialized knowledge is required to opinion as to whether vest was body armor per Criminal Code. Section of Criminal Code under which Defendant was convicted is limited to those lacking FOID card, and is thus not facially unconstitutional. (HYMAN and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Defendant failed to meet burden to rebut presumption that FOID card requirement in section (a)(3)(C) of AUUW statute is constitutionally sound. (SIMON and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of delivery of cocaine. Rule 651(c) does not apply where initial postconviction petition was filed by retained counsel. All Defendants should enjoy right to same reasonable level of assistance at first and second stages of postconviction proceedings. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery of a child. Using a four-year-old child as an exhibit was extremely prejudicial as risk of inflaming jury outweighed probative value of evidence. State did not meet its requirement of showing more than mere suspicion that Defendant actually caused victim's liver contusion. Court properly barred evidence of victim's mother's prostitution arrests and loss of custody of her children.Evidence was sufficient to prove Defendant guilty of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, no double jeopardy impediment to new trial on those counts. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.).