Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his state conviction on charges of fleeing and eluding traffic officer, even though defendant argued that state court violated his right to present effective defense by denying his request to present testimony from third-party that said officer had “confrontational, aggressive and hot-tempered” character. Defendant had no prior personal knowledge of officer’s character at time of defendant’s arrest, and under Wisconsin and federal rules of evidence, defendant could not generally advance propensity evidence to show that it was more likely that officer was aggressive at time of arrest. Moreover, excluding such character evidence served to prevent jury from confusing issues regarding what actually happened during defendant’s arrest, and defendant otherwise was able to present his self-defense claim in absence of such testimony.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on wire fraud charges stemming from scheme in which defendant mailed numerous documents/complaints containing false statements to small claims courts in Wisconsin and hiding existence of said complaints from named defendants in said complaints so that defendant could obtain default judgments and ultimately monetary recoveries based on said default judgments. While defendant argued that he could not be found guilty of wire fraud because any false statements were made to Wisconsin courts, as opposed to defendants named in complaints, there is no requirement that false statement be made directly to victim of scheme. Moreover, wire fraud was established, where defendant used false statements about his alleged service of complaints on named defendants as means to defraud named defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, after jury found defendant guilty on drug conspiracy charge, even though defendant denied that he was aware that certain packages that he was handling contained bricks of marijuana. Dist. Ct. appropriately gave jury “ostrich instruction,” and defendant’s statements to police demonstrated that he knew or strongly suspected that he was involved in criminal activity, but deliberately avoided learning that drugs were present in subject packages.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendants’ convictions on wire and bankruptcy fraud charges arising out of scheme to secretly purchase homes from financially distressed owners under guise of saving said homes for said owners, but then using said properties to obtain inflated mortgage money from lenders and then stripping any equity from said properties. While one defendant claimed that she could not be convicted of wire fraud since fraudulent transactions that resulted in transfer of loan funds to escrow account had already occurred by time she participated in scheme, jury could properly find her guilty of charged offense where transfer of funds was intermediate step, and where defendant’s actions, as closing agent, were necessary to transfer funds from escrow account to other defendants. Moreover, record contained sufficient evidence to support another defendant’s convictions on wire and bankruptcy fraud charges, arising out of said defendant’s participation during real estate closings and representation of owners during certain Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, where jury could reasonable conclude that: (1) defendant, as attorney, was aware that loan documents contained false information; and (2) defendant took steps to conceal from trustee and bankruptcy court existence of recent transfers of owners' homes to third-parties. Fact that no creditor was defrauded did not require different result.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing expert to testify regarding true meaning of code words contained in recorded conversation between defendant and others that described terms of drug deal. Experts may testify as to meaning of such code words where, as here, instant expert based his testimony on his own knowledge of common practices in drug trade and not on any personal knowledge of underlying subject matter of recorded conversation. Dist. Ct. also did not commit reversible error in admitting evidence of defendant’s uncharged participation in prior ecstasy transaction, where: (1) one recorded conversation at issue in charged offense contained defendant’s reference to ecstasy; and (2) evidence of defendant’s involvement in charged methamphetamine transaction was overwhelming.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder and carjacking conviction on grounds that means used to identify him as culprit, including presentation of photo arrays, were fatally flawed, where record showed that defendant had procedurally defaulted said claim by failing to adequately raise them in state courts. Defendant raised only sentencing issues on direct appeal, and his single sentence reference in his post-conviction petition to claim that computer-generated photo presented to eye-witness was unduly suggestive, without citation to case law or constitutional clauses, did not alert state court to federal, constitutional nature of instant due process claim. Fact that Illinois Appellate Court made factual finding that denied defendant’s claim that photographic identifications were suggestive did not demonstrate that said court made ruling on merits of instant due process claim, where said court did not address said finding in context of due process claim. Also, defendant’s affidavit asserting that detective had committed misfeasance in his case and in cases of other individuals was insufficient to establish defendant’s actual innocence to charges, so as to excuse defendant’s procedural default.