Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on court-appointed attorney's failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c). Attorney appointed to represent Defendant in post-conviction proceeding withdrew on grounds that Defendant's petition was incurably meritless. Defendant then had no further statutory right to counsel, absent unusual circumstances, and had no right to a reasonable level of assistance from subsequently appointed attorney. (McLAREN and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of criminal damage to government-supported property, after having shattered rear passenger window by kicking it with his foot while seated in squad car during traffic stop. Testimony of fleet manager, that State funds are used to maintain police vehicles, was sufficient to prove that car was government-supported property. (CARTER, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/20/13.) Respondent in a Sexually Violent Person (SVP) proceeding who does not suffer from an actual mental disorder should not be involuntarily committed. Respondent's diagnosis of a novel condition,a diagnosis addendum to his paraphilia diagnosis, of "sexually attracted to early pubesent males", was not shown by State to be generally accepted as a mental disorder. Thus, court should have conducted a Frye hearing. (NEVILLE and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant and another person were charged with first degree murder for 1993 shooting deaths of seven people at restaurant; Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, after severed jury trial. Prosecutor's remarks complimenting State's fingerprint expert were not improper, as they were based on expert's testimony and inferences, and argument that expert's credibility was not meaningfully challenged. Prosecutor's argument that Defendant's DNA expert was "motivated by money" was proper effort to establish possible bias. Court properly denied Defendant's motion in limine to admit out-of-court statements from two witnesses. Statements were hearsay but were not self-incriminating statements against declarants' penal interests. Witnesses' admission to being present at crime scene and seeing murders occur, but with no evidence that witnesses intended to obstruct justice, does not render them statements against penal interest sufficient for exception. (LAVIN and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Court properly admitted other-crimes evidence as to sexual assault of another female victim six years prior, as both offenses were sufficiently factually similar under balancing test weighing prejudicial impact and probative value of evidence. Court properly allowed State to cross-examine Defendant as to events occurring with previous victim, and did not thereby violate his right against self-incrimination, because it properly discredited Defendant's testimony, was probative of his intent and motive, and impeached his claim of consent. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault and predatory criminal assault of his younger adopted sister over many years. Evidence of victim's resulting pregnancy and abortion were directly relevant as products of crime charged. State's reference to abortion was specifically invited by defense counsel's closing questioning State's proof of procedure. Jury found Defendant's confession credible, and thus no reasonable probability that ouctcome would have been different if jury had been instructed that victim's letter to her friend, claiming that her boyfriend raped her, could be considered as substantive evidence. (HARRIS and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of operating motor vehicle iwht expired registration, improper lane usage, and DUI. State presented certified driving abstract to elevate DUI conviction to aggravated DUI. Court erred in failin to give each individual juror opportunity to answer whether he or she understood each of the four Rule 431(b) Zehr principles during voir dire. Jury's note stating that therre were very strong feelings both ways did not indicate evidence was closely balanced, as jury resumed deliberating after court told jury to continue deliberating. Closing remarks by State were not improper, and were invited by defense arguments. (STEIGMANN and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and misdemeanor domestic battery. Defense counsel was ineffective in agreeing to join weapons charges with domestic battery charge, as there was no sound defense strategy to do so, without a precise limiting instruction to make purposes of evidence clear. Court incorrectly instructed jury, in failing to tailor IPI 3.14 based on evidence presented. Cumulative effect of errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial, and errors were intertwined such that prejudice to Defendant was amplified. Defendant should then receive new, separate trials, with precise jury instructions. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was sentenced to 35 years for first-degree murder. Sentence and plea agreement were void because Defendant did not receive, and was not admonished about, mandatory sentencing enhancement. Even if State intended to remove enhancement when negotiating plea, State did nothing to remove enhancement from factual basis for plea, but could have amended factual basis to support accountability or other theory. Court was thus required to sentence Defendant with enhancement.(HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)