Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly proceeded to dispositional hearing immediately following trial in which respondent was found to be sexually violent person, where respondent requested that said hearing be continued to later date following his submission to new supplemental mental examination. While trial court, in denying respondent’s continuance request and entering instant commitment order, determined that record already contained sufficient evidence to find that respondent was in need of treatment, Appellate Court, in vacating trial court’s commitment order, found that section 40(b)(1) of Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act required that trial court continue dispositional hearing where respondent had indicated that he wished to present witness at later date.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s pro se section 2-1401 petition alleging that his 25-year sentence for unlawful delivery of controlled substance should be reduced by three years, where defendant claimed that Dept. of Corrections impermissibly added three-year mandatory supervised release term to his sentence under circumstances where sentencing court made no mention that defendant would be required to serve term of mandatory supervised release and did not mention any mandatory supervised release term in court’s written sentencing order. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that defendant’s three-year mandatory supervised release term attached by operation of law and not by any action taken by Dept. of Corrections.

This case presents question as to whether, in instant prosecution on driving vehicle while driver's license was suspended, trial court properly suppressed evidence of male defendant’s driver’s license status, under circumstances where officer’s sole purpose for stopping vehicle in which defendant was driver was to determine whether driver was female owner of said vehicle who was subject of arrest warrant, and where officer, after determining that defendant was not said owner, asked for defendant’s driver’s license. Although defendant conceded that officer made valid stop of vehicle to determine identity of driver, Appellate Court, in affirming instant suppression order, found that defendant had been subjected to unreasonable seizure when officer requested him to produce driver’s license since officer’s reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity had dissipated at time of said request. Appellate Court further noted, though, that it would have been reasonable for officer to explain reason for stop, advise defendant that he was free to go, and then request defendant’s license in context of consensual encounter. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether govt. failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt defendant’s guilt on charge of aggravated discharge of weapon in direction of police officer, where said conviction was based on accountability theory. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction, found that rational trier-of-fact could have found defendant accountable for shooting of officer where defendant acknowledged in written statement that he agreed to drive shooter around neighborhood so that shooter could burglarize parked cars, and that under common design rule, defendant was responsible for shooter’s acts in furtherance of said plan to burglarize that included instant shooting of officer. Appellate Court further noted that defendant had assisted shooter by driving him away from crime scene after shooting, and by pretending that neither he nor shooter was present in apartment when police knocked on apartment door. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that record contained insufficient evidence of his guilt where he did not know that shooter possessed firearm prior to shooting, and that court could not infer intent to discharge firearm based on defendant’s actions taken after said shooting.

This case presents question as to whether, after defendant had been convicted of murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault, trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction motion under section 116-3 seeking Y-STR DNA test of semen stain found on victim’s pants, where said denial was based on trial court’s determination that no experts had indicated that new DNA test would yield different result, and that defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that requested Y-STR DNA test had scientific potential to produce new non-cumulative evidence that was materially relevant to defendant’s assertion of actual innocence. Dissent, as well as govt. in its petition for leave to appeal, argued that denial was appropriate because defendant had failed to indicate how Y-STR DNA test would produce more probative result than prior DNA test that did not exclude defendant as possible contributor to semen sample, especially where defendant had not claimed any error on part of forensic scientists who had conducted prior DNA test.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s pro se post-conviction petition that challenged his first-degree murder conviction, where dismissal was based on defendant’s failure to include notarized affidavit attesting to veracity of petition’s contents. Appellate Court held that instant first-stage dismissal was proper under Carr, 407 Ill.App.3d 513, due to defendant’s non-compliance with affidavit requirement under section 122-1(b) of Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Appellate Court further observed that defendant should not be able to allege anything that guarantees that his petition proceed to second-stage consideration under Act without verifying that said allegations are true. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court in fitness restoration proceeding properly found that defendant was unfit to stand trial (and that it was not reasonably probable that defendant would be fit to stand trial within one year), where defendant was unable to recall events surrounding incidents leading to charges of home invasion and aggravated unlawful restraint in view of fact that defendant had incurred brain damage resulting from self-inflicted gunshot wound. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that defendant’s inability to recall anything that occurred within 48 hours leading up to events at issue in case supported trial court’s conclusion that defendant was not fit to stand trial given emphasis in applicable statute that defendant be able to recall and relate to counsel events at issue in charged offense. In its petition for leave to appeal, state argued that defendant’s inability to recollect events on day of charged offenses due to amnesia or brain injury did not, by itself, support finding that defendant was unfit to stand trial.