Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ habeas petitions challenging their sentences imposed after each defendant had entered into guilty plea, where defendants alleged that govt. deprived them of benefit of their guilty pleas by imposing three-year terms of mandatory supervised release (MSR) in spite of fact that their plea agreements made no mention of MSR. Neither defendant filed timely habeas petition within one year of date on which their convictions became final, and neither defendant could assert later date to trigger one-year filing requirement where: (1) both defendants were told by court at sentencing hearing that their crimes subjected them to MSR; and (2) both defendants could have inquired at sentencing hearing whether MSR was part of their plea bargains. Moreover, defendants’ claims lacked legal merit where both defendants failed to show that prosecutor promised to waive MSR as inducement for them to enter guilty plea.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge involving crack cocaine, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in admitting testimony regarding uncharged conduct concerning defendant's involvement in drug sales with third-party, even though defendant argued that said evidence merely showed his propensity to commit bad acts. Said evidence was admissible on issue as to whether defendant was aware of third-party’s drug activities, as well as whether defendant had access to crack cocaine to rebut defendant’s argument that he was unaware that clear package that he attributed to said third-party and delivered to informant contained crack cocaine. However, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing where: (1) at time of sentencing, Dist. Ct. did not apply Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which reduced sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine; and (2) under Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. 2321, FSA’s statutory penalties applied to defendant’s sentence, even though defendant’s underlying conduct occurred prior to enactment of FSA.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine seized from backpack in defendant’s car after police observed defendant’s vehicle stop briefly in garage of home of suspected high-level drug dealer. Police had probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle where officer had purchased 10 kilograms at same house less than hour before defendant’s vehicle arrived at said house, and where defendant’s peculiar approach to house mirrored that of officer’s vehicle after both cars met another vehicle that led them to said house. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting phone calls defendant made to third-party that contained conversations about uncharged drug transactions where said evidence was introduced to show defendant’s knowledge about contents of backpack. However, new trial was required where prosecutor repeatedly called defendant drug dealer and drug trafficker during closing argument based upon said phone calls, and thus improperly urged jury to convict defendant based on his propensity to commit drug crimes.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying motion by defendant’s counsel for extension of time to consider filing post-conviction motions, where counsel’s motion was filed five months after deadline for filing post-conviction motions under Rules 29 and 33, and two months after counsel had been appointed to represent defendant. Counsel failed to demonstrate that “excusable neglect” caused instant late filing where counsel merely asserted that he spent “extended amount of time” in reviewing file and speaking to witnesses. Moreover, counsel failed to explain why it took two months to file instant motion that merely requested more time to consider filing any post-conviction motion and did not suggest any specific grounds for possible post-conviction motions.

In prosecution for making false statements related to provision of heath care in violation of 18 USC section 1035, Dist. Ct. committed plain error in giving instruction that failed to inform jury that defendant-physician made false statement in connection with delivery of or payment for health care benefit program since tendered instruction allowed jury to convict for conduct not covered under section 1035. However, any error was harmless where defendant’s medical reports involved defendant’s bills to health care benefit program, i.e. Medicare, and where said reports satisfied materiality element of instant charge since said reports had potential to influence Medicare’s decision to pay defendant for his medical services. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for specific intent instruction since section 1035 does not require that defendant make false statement with intent to deceive govt.