Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing defendant’s section 2241 habeas petition challenging his 360-month sentence on drug and firearm charges after Delaware Dist. Ct. found that defendant qualified as career offender under section 4B1.1 of USSG based, in part, on his prior Delaware conviction for 3rd Degree Arson. Defendant could properly seek relief under section 2241 to challenge propriety of his sentence and could properly seek relief in instant case where he could not have challenged his career offender status in his prior section 2255 petition because it was foreclosed by binding legal precedent at time said petition had been filed. Moreover, under subsequent decision in Begay, 553 US 137, Delaware conviction was not crime of violence for purposes of section 4B1.1 since instant Delaware arson statute, which permitted conviction for reckless damage to building through intentional starting of fire, did not contemplate sort of purposeful conduct contemplated for crime of violence.

In prosecution on charge of inducing minor to create sexually explicit images, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence that defendant had sexually abused two of victim’s sisters. Said evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to establish defendant’s motive to commit charged offense and to rebut defendant’s claim that he had never taken subject photographs or engaged in sexual abuse of victim. Fact that proffered evidence did not involve creation of sexually explicit photographs did not require different result since said evidence was relevant to establish defendant’s sexual interest in under-aged girls. Dist. Ct. also did not err in admitting defendant’s booking photographs to establish similarity of defendant’s appearance at time of arrest to male figure depicted in photographs, where said pictures could explain defendant’s recent weight loss, and where photographs failed to contain any formal indicia demonstrating that pictures were jailhouse booking photographs.

In prosecution on charge of failing to register as sex offender as required under SORNA, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to term of supervised release subject to 10 special conditions. Because nothing about defendant’s failure to register as sex offender demonstrated that it was sex offense, Dist. Ct. erred in relying on section 5D1.2(b)(2) of USSG to impose lifetime term of supervised release. Moreover, applicable guideline for supervised release was five-year term. Dist. Ct. also erred in imposing special conditions requiring defendant to install internet monetary software and to refrain from being in proximity to minors where instant offense did not involve computer or child victim.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to life imprisonment on kidnapping charge based, in part, on imposition of enhancement under section 2A4.1(b)(1) of USSG where defendant made “ransom demand” during charged offense. New sentencing hearing was required since “ransom demand” for purposes of section 2A4.1(b)(1) requires showing that demand was made to third-party, and record indicated that defendant made said demand only on defendant himself.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his drug conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert constitutional speedy trial violation in addition to successful Speedy Trial Act violation that resulted in dismissal without prejudice of first indictment, and for failing to argue on grounds of collateral estoppel that trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to suppress statements in first proceeding precluded trial court from denying defendant’s similar motion in second proceeding. While doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in criminal cases, said doctrine did not apply in instant case where: (1) govt. did not oppose defendant’s motion to suppress in first proceeding; (2) trial court, in granting motion to suppress, did not decide whether defendant’s statements should have been suppressed; and (3) dismissal of first indictment was not based on result of defendant’s motion to suppress. Moreover, defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert constitutional speedy trial violation in first proceeding, so as to make any dismissal with prejudice, where defendant failed to show prejudice in 19-month delay at issue in first proceeding, and where defendant failed to show existence of invidious reason attributable to govt. that was cause of delay.

Ct. of Appeals granted govt.’s motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal of his conviction on charge of sale of unregistered security, where said motion was based on fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Record showed that defendant had failed to return to U.S. as required pursuant to terms of his bond, and dismissal of instant appeal was warranted where defendant became fugitive, had filed no brief on his behalf, and had expressed no interest in return to U.S. to serve his sentence.