Criminal Law

For purposes of Section 3-3 of Criminal Code, "knowledge" or "known to the proper prosecuting officer" means conscious awareness of evidence that is sufficient to give the State a reasonable chance to secure a conviction. When the State has that awareness is determined on a case-by-case basis. What the State knew and when are factual determinations which should not be done during first stage of postconviction review. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Extent to which additional circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver must be shown to support a conviction is to be decided on a case-by-case approach. Defendant's possession of an amount of cocaine and heroin consistent with personal use, and absence of drug paraphernalia commonly used for personal consumption, are not sufficient evidence of an intent to deliver. Officers could reasonably infer Defendant consented to a search by clear words "Let me show you what I've got" and gesture to his pants pocket. Court has broad discretion to determine nature and extent of standby counsel's involvement, and court properly refused to appoint standby counsel to litigate a motion as Defendant had prepared it.(LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Respondent was found to be a sexually violent person under Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, after jury trial. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to State's opening remark, and expert's testimony that IDOC screens all who have committed a sexually violent offense and that only about 2% of population gets out and is then evaluated to determine if a sexually violent person; this information was relevant to explain how expert came to evaluate Respondent. (EPSTEIN, concurring; PUCINSKI, specially concurring.)

Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction as to codefendant's videotaped statement, as evidence was overwhelming against Defendant. Codefendant testified at trial consistently with material on tape, and jury verdict would likely not have been different. Autopsy report was not testimonial and its admission into evidence did not implicate Defendant's confrontation clause rights. Court did not err in barring physician from testifying, as her testimony was irrelevant to voluntariness of statement at time of arrest, and its exclusion did not infringe on his right to present a defense. (LAVIN and STERBA, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed successive postconviction petition which raised freestanding claim of innocence based on new DNA testing performed on several pieces of evidence. New DNA evidence does not exonerate Defendant as it does not show that he did not commit the crimes charged, and does not undermine trial testimony of lab expert and co-Defendant witness. (QUINN and SIMON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 4/23/13.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. For prior consistent statement of witness to be admitted, the Defendant must show that witness did not have a motive to testify falsely at time of statement. Witness' statements did not qualify her later statements, but merely contradicted prior inconsistent statements, and thus are inadmissible under the completeness doctrine. Contradiction alone cannot give rise to a charge of recent fabrication, and as there was not express or implied charge that witness' testimony was a recent fabrication, prior statement is inadmissible under recent fabrication exception. (HOLDRIDGE and SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

Court's failure to inform Defendant that the prison term for aggravated fleeing would run consecutively to the other two prison terms was a failure to explicitly inform him of the true maximum penalty,and did not satisfy 401(a) requirements for admonishments.(POPE and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Officer stopped Defendant for not having a working rear license plate light, then discovered his license was revoked and arrested. Officer found glass pipe containing drug residue during inventory search. Criminal Code requires that police keep recordings made as part of an arrest and destroyed only upon a final disposition and court order. Violation of Code does not require suppression as a remedy (APPLETON and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Minor testified that Defendant, who pulled up alongside minor in his vehicle, asked him if he wanted to buy Jordan shoes, and minor saw that pornography was playing on a laptop tilted partway toward vehicle window. Court improperly instructed jury on distribution of harmful material to a minor, as that was not charged nor pursued as theory by State at trial. Court thereby introduced a new theory not argued by the State, without Defendant having opportunity to defend himself against it. Jury may not have found Defendant guilty of child abduction absent that instruction. (APPLETON and TURNER, concurring.)

Court was well awared of the need to inquire into Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and conducted inquiry as to Defendant's request to have conflict counsel appointed. Court erred in not conducting a full hearing on the merits of Defendant's pro se motion. Court should have clearly informed Defendant that he was not entitled to conflict counsel, upon concluding that his pro se claims of ineffectiveness were without merit, and should have then allowed counsel to argue any remaining issues. Defendant was denied his right to counsel when, after concluding Krankel inquiry, court did not allow counsel to argue merits of motion. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)