Criminal Law

Defendant was was 15 years old at the time the offenses were committed, pleaded guilty, via accountability, to first degree murder, attempted first degree murder of a peace officer, and armed robbery. Defendant appealed from the second-stage denial of her post-conviction petition and argued that her post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend her petition to include a proportionate penalties claim. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the facts of the case supported bringing a proportionate penalties claim and counsel was ineffective for failing to do so. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring and PUCINSKI, specially concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention. Defendant argued on appeal that the State merely recounted the charges filed against him and his prior convictions and that it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition could mitigate the risk defendant posed to the community. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err where the evidence established that defendant had failed to comply with conditions imposed in past cases. (McLAREN and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating an order of protection and was sentenced to 18 months in prison in addition to four years of mandatory supervised release, which sentencing law required to be supervised through electronic monitoring. Defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he did not know that his supervised release would require electronic monitoring. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court remanded for new post-plea counsel to allow defendant to properly raise issues that were raised for the first time at the hearing on the post-plea stage. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)

The State appealed from a trial court order denying its petition to revoke pretrial release of defendant who was charged with multiple felonies, including burglary. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred when it determined it was not authorized to detain the defendant when the defendant committed a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor while on pretrial release for prior charges. (WELCH and CATES, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his attempt to present a mistake-of-age defense at trial and when it refused to allow him to call the victim to the stand during sentencing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that mistake-of-age is not available as a defense for a charge of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under the statutory language. The appellate court also found that defendant could not object to the trial court refusing to allow him to call the victim as a witness during sentencing where defendant acquiesced a procedure where defendant was allowed to present evidence without calling the victim to testify. (PETERSON and DAVENPORT, concurring)

Defendant entered a negotiated plea deal where he pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years in prison. After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to receive credit for the time he spent in home detention prior to the plea. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed, finding that a fully negotiated plea constituted a waiver of pre-sentence custody credit not provided for in the plea agreement. The supreme court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment finding that the plea agreement unambiguously addressed the question of credit for time served. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault. The evidence presented at trial included defendant’s medical records indicating that he had been diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease. Defendant argued on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his trial attorney failed to object to the evidence on the grounds that it was privileged under the physician-patient privilege statute. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. The supreme court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, finding that the appellate court correctly determined that the physician-patient privilege statute did apply but that an exception contained in the statute also applied under the facts of the case making the records admissible and that any objection would have been futile. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder of her toddler son and was sentenced to 33 years in prison. Before trial, defendant had sought to suppress a video reenactment of the child’s death on the grounds that police should have first admonished her under Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court also affirmed, finding that while there was a violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights, it did not amount to plain error because it was not a structural error and the evidence of guilt presented at trial was not closely balanced. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision)