Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release. At issue in the appeal was the scope of the State’s power to petition for pretrial detention of defendants who previously were ordered released prior to adoption of the Pretrial Fairness Act, but who remained in custody at the time the new law was implemented. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the legislature did not intent to allow the State to file a petition for pretrial detention under the circumstances of a case like defendants where the defendant was ordered released on electronic monitoring subsequent to the payment of a monetary bond. The court further held that defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine why he remained in custody three months after the elimination of the requirements that he post a monetary bond and whether there is set of conditions that would allow for his pretrial release. (D.B. WALKER and R. VAN TINE, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to a total of 35 years in prison. On direct appeal defendant argued he was denied a fair trial because the court misapplied the completeness doctrine and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a victim interview during defendant’s case-in-chief. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant had forfeited the argument regarding the completeness doctrine and that it did not constitute plain error because defendant acquiesced to the error. The appellate court also concluded that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where the admission of the interview evidence was not necessary for the defendant’s theory of the case and the decision not to admit it was a strategic decision by counsel. (McLAREN and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with traveling to meet a child and indecent solicitation of a child, appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was a real and present threat to safety and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat that he posed and that the trial court erred by not making written findings summarizing its decision. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered defendant detained and that the trial court’s non-compliance with the statutorily-required written findings was not reversible error because the trial court provided a lengthy and adequate explanation in open court of its decision. (DeARMOND, concurring and TURNER, specially concurring)

Defendant, who was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, appealed from a trial court order requiring him to submit to drug testing as a condition of pretrial release. Defendant argued on appeal that the State did not establish that random drug testing three times a month was the least restrictive condition necessary for release. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err when it found by clear and convincing evidence that drug testing was necessary, especially when it considered that defendant was also before the court on a warrant for failure to appear in another case. (McLAREN and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon with a revoked FOID card and sentenced to two years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence and that the State failed to prove that she was reckless in not knowing her FOID card had been revoked. The appellate court affirmed and defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal. The supreme court denied the petition, but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its prior judgment and to reconsider its decision based on recent supreme court precedent. On remand, the appellate court agreed that an error occurred because the State was required to prove that defendant was aware that her FOID card had expired and reversed defendant's conviction. (HARRIS, concurring and CAVANAGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part)