Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated domestic battery and was sentenced to consecutive terms of seven years for each count. Defendant argued on appeal that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel, that the State failed to prove him guilty of aggravated domestic battery, and that the circuit court violated his right to remain silent when it ordered him to participate in the preparation of his pre-sentence investigation report. The appellate court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery and reduced the convictions to Class 3 aggravated battery and remanded for resentencing. Defendant appealed his on his speedy trial and waiver of counsel claims to the supreme court and the supreme court affirmed the order of the appellate court. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. Defendant later filed a successive post-conviction petition alleging actual innocence and that his attorney failed to investigate before recommending a plea agreement. The appellate court reversed an order of the trial court dismissing the petition by finding that defendant was not barred from raising a claim of actual innocence despite having pleaded guilty. The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, determining that whether to grant leave to file a successive post-conviction based on an actual innocence claim, the same standard applies to all petitioners, regardless of whether they pleaded guilty, and that each claim in a successive post-conviction petition must meet the applicable standard in order to advance to second-state proceedings. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. THEIS, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction, finding the prosecution failed to prove that defendant had two prior qualifying felony convictions. The supreme court reversed the appellate court, finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of being an armed habitual criminal where defense counsel stipulated that defendant had the two requisite convictions. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that provisions of the criminal code relating to child sex offenders, including the provision that prohibits child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a home daycare, were unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed most of plaintiff’s claims but held that the residency restriction violated substantive due process and equal protection. The supreme court vacated and remanded the portion of the circuit court’s order finding the residency requirement unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff, reversed the portion of the circuit court order finding the residency requirement facially unconstitutional, and affirmed the remainder of the order dismissing the plaintiff’s remaining claims. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. NEVILLE took no part in the decision)

Defendant appealed from the first stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the summary dismissal and the manner in which the trial court handled an amended pleading was improper. Defendant also field a motion under SCR 472(a)(3) seeking credit against his sentence for time spent confined at home while on bond, which the trial court denied. The appellate court agreed that the defendant was not entitled to a credit against his sentence; however, the appellate court agreed with the defendant that his petition should not have been summarily dismissed. (KENNEDY and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court’s determination that the defendant posed a high likelihood of willful flight was against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant, who was a resident of Wisconsin, had waived an extradition hearing, was a long-term resident of Wisconsin, and had family in Illinois. The appellate court also concluded that the State failed to prove that no set of conditions could mitigate any risk of willful flight. (BIRKETT, concurring and HUTCHINSON, specially concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with reckless homicide after he was involved in a car collision, appealed from a trial court order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that where the State put on no evidence that pretrial detention was necessary and did not object to the recommendation for release made by the Office of Statewide Pretrial Services, the State had failed to satisfy its burden for pretrial detention. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, appealed from a trial court order denying pretrial release. Defendant argued that the State’s petition to detain was untimely and that the State failed to meet its burden of proof for detention. The appellate court held hat there was no error in the trial court’s determination that continued detention was necessary based on the nature of the offenses charged and defendant’s criminal background. (ELLIS and COBBS, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced to two years of probation. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she knew the car she was driving was stolen, that the trial court improperly relied on the statutory inference of knowledge in finding her guilty, and that the statutory inference of knowledge in the possession of a motor vehicle was unconstitutional as applied to her. The appellate court reversed, finding that the evidence presented at trial was so unsatisfactory that it created a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring)

Defendant, who was arrested and held pursuant to payment of bail before the implementation date of the Pre-Trial Fairness Act, appealed from a trial court order denying his petition for pretrial release after the Act went into effect. The State did not respond to defendant’s petition or file a petition for pretrial detention. The appellate court vacated the detention orders entered by the trial court, finding that the filing of a motion by the prosecutor was a condition precedent to the circuit court having the authorization to deny pretrial release and that there was no provision that would allow the State to orally move for pretrial detention or permit the trial court to order detention sua sponte. (VAUGHAN and McHANEY, concurring)