Criminal Law

Officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify Terry stop of Defendant, and thus court properly denied motion to quash arrest and suppress. Woman flagged down officer and told him that she saw a man put a machine gun into the back of a car. Although woman remained unidentified, the more resembles a citizen informant than an anonymous informant, as she engaged in a face-to-face conversation with officer she approached, and she never attempted to hide her identity. Thus, her tip was sufficiently reliable to allow officer to reasonably infer Defendant's involvement criminal activity, justifying Terry stop. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Court abused its discretion when it did not properly consider Defendant's request to proceed pro se on his postconviction petition. Defendant made a timely and unambiguous request to represent himself, and could should first determine whether he has knowingly and intelligently relinquished his statutory right to counsel. Defendant's request was not dilatory, as it was made shortly after he had reason to do so, when defense counsel decisively refused to make or endorse the pro se amendments, and he should not be responsible for his counsel's delays in reviewing record and evaluating potential claims. (EPSTEIN and TAYLOR, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/7/13.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and for personally discharging a firearm during each crime. Evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder under accountability theory. Defendant armed himself with a gun and gave co-Defendant the gun he used to shoot the victim, and Defendant was an active participant in the orchestrated shooting that resulted in death of one and severe wounding of another victim. Defendant is subject to 20-year sentencing enhancement, as a defendant who aids or abets another in committing a crime is accountable and may be punished in compliance with statutes for any criminal act his codefendant did in furtherance of crime. (REYES, concurring; R.E. GORDON, concurring in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death. Court did not err in not asking Defendant if he agreed with tender of second degree murder instruction (requested by defense counsel) and understood its consequences. A defendant can only be found guilty of second degree murder if State has first proven all elements of first degree murder, and thus a defendant is not exposing himself to potential criminal liability which he might otherwise avoid by tendering second degree murder instruction. Court erred in not inquiring as to jury's understanding and acceptance of principle that Defendant's failure to testify could not be held against him, but no plain error as evidence was not closely balanced. That jury sent notes to judge during deliberations, no indication that jury had reached an impasse or that jurors considered this a close case. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE and FREEMAN, dissenting.)

Officer in unmarked car heard Defendant yelling "dro, dro" to a passing vehicle in front of Chicago Housing Authority building. Officer testified that based on his experience, "dro, dro" is slang for sale of cannabis. Facts known by police at time of arrest were sufficient to constitute probable cause, as police observed Defendant committing offense of solicitation of unlawful business, and location at known narcotics sales spot was one factor contributing to probable cause. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)