Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his first degree murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to present evidence of defendant’s mental illness that defendant claimed would have bolstered his claim of self-defense. Record failed to demonstrate that defendant was suffering from any delusions at time of charged offense or that his mental illness caused him to perceive murder victim as physical threat. Thus, defendant failed to show that evidence of his mental disease would have made many difference in outcome of trial. Ct. further noted that second degree murder statute did not provide as mitigating factor existence of mental disorder that would have caused defendant to overreact to non-physical threat.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 151-month sentence on assault with weapon charge where said sentence was based on defendant’s status as career offender, and where defendant’s career offender status was based on two prior “walkaway” escape convictions that courts subsequently determined were not violent felonies within meaning of Armed Career Criminal Act. Record showed that defendant’s maximum sentence was 240-month term of incarceration, and although Dist. Ct.’s erroneous finding that defendant qualified for armed career status was correctible on direct appeal, said error was not correctible in post conviction petition where, as here, instant error involved calculation of sentence under mere advisory sentencing guideline, and where Dist. Ct. also found that defendant’s sentence was reasonable even without application of career offender enhancement. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ requests to reduce their sentences on drug charges involving crack cocaine where both requests were based on retroactive changes to sentencing guidelines that reduced ratio between crack and powder cocaine, and where defendants were originally given sentences that were below statutory minimum due to their rendering of substantial assistance to prosecution. Dist. Ct. improperly found that section 5G1.1 of USSG applied and precluded defendants from any re-sentencing since their amended guideline ranges would not be reduced by retroactive changes to sentencing guidelines. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have used section 1B1.10 of USSG, which would allow defendants to receive potentially lower sentence that also reflected any reward for their cooperation with prosecution.

In prosecution on drug distribution and conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to give jury buyer-seller instruction to emphasize to jury that charge of conspiracy requires more than buyer-seller relationship. Defendant argued theory that he was completely innocent of both drug charges, and thus buyer-seller instruction would have contradicted this theory. Dist. Ct. also properly overruled defendant’s hearsay objection to govt. witness’ testimony that third-party had asked him if he was “with Black,” i.e., defendant, during drug deal; hearsay rule did not apply since said rule applies only to out-of-court “statements” and not to instant “question.”