Criminal Law

Court complied with statutory time period of holding hearing on Defendant's ability to pay a public defender fee within 90 days of entry of final order. Trial court's three questions about Defendant's employment status were insufficient to satisfy statutory requirements for hearing, and thus appellate court properly remanded cause for new hearing. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Circuit court properly denied Defendant's pro se motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition, and appellate court properly affirmed denial. Defendant asserted as "cause" in his motion ignorance of the law, as reason for his failure to include a claim in his initial postconviction petition that his due process rights are violated as he is required to serve three-year MSR term that was neither imposed nor mentioned at sentencing. Uniform Code of Corrections' mandate of MSR term was and is the law, and Defendant is charged with full knowledge of it. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Court found Defendant, age 20, guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder of his father. Court found that, per expert's opinion, Defendant was not insane because his psychosis was brought on by his drug and alcohol use. Court's findings were not against manifest weight of evidence, and court was not required to sua sponte find Defendant guilty of second degree murder. Sentence of 27 years was not excessive. (APPLETON and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault. Defendant beat victim severely about the head, causing hemhorraghing. Incapacitating effects of physical beating can rob victim of ability to give knowing consent. Rational trier of fact could have found that victim could not give knowing consent as a result of severe beating by Defendant, whether she was conscious or unconscious at time of intercourse shortly after beating.(McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of criminal trespass to real property and criminal damage to property, as result of break-in at business. Defendant was identified in "showup identification" by business owner who viewed crime in progress on live surveillance video feed, broadcast online and accessed on laptop, though video did not record what business owner observed, as record function on laptop was turned off. Evidence was sufficient for rational trier of fact to conclude that security camera system was working properly. That business owner identified suspects only by race and clothing did not render his identification unreliable, as he testified that he recognized Defendant's face. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Court erred in delaying ruling on State's motion in limine on admissibility of Defendant's prior convictions, without any stated basis other than stating that it had a right to do so. However, evidence was so overwhelming against Defendant that no plain error. (PALMER and TAYLOR, concurring.)

(Court opinion modified upon denial of rehearing 2/7/13).Corroboration is sufficient to satisfy corpus delicti rule if evidence, or reasonable inferences based on it, tends to support commission of a crime that is at least closely related to the charged offense. Corroboration of only some of the circumstances related in a defendant's confession which tend to connect the defendant with the crime is sufficient. (FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring; THOMAS, specially concurring.)