Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that police officials denied him his 6th Amendment right to counsel when police officials obtained his confession after he had received and waived his Miranda warnings, and after complaint for preliminary examination had been filed, but before defendant’s initial appearance at bond hearing. Defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel had not attached at time defendant made his confession since, under Illinois law, complaint for preliminary examination does not initiate formal proceedings against defendant. Moreover, while right to counsel would attach when defendant made his appearance at bond hearing, Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that state court erred in finding that his confession occurred prior to said bond hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to life sentence on charge of possession of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Said sentence was mandated under 21 USC section 841(b)(1)(A), and Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant life sentence violated 8th Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 15-year term of incarceration on unlawful possession of firearm charge after finding that defendant was armed career criminal based on four prior convictions that qualified as violent felonies. While defendant argued that two of his prior convictions did not qualify for armed career criminal sentencing treatment since Illinois statute at time of his 1981 and 1982 convictions restored his ability to possess firearms by 1989, both convictions qualified for armed career criminal sentencing treatment where: (1) said Illinois statute was repealed in 1984; and (2) defendant had committed other offenses after 1984 that precluded him from restoring his right to possess firearms under repealed statute.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another inmate. While defendant argued that he did not inflict serious bodily injury on victim, evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury element of offense as contained in 18 USC section 113(b)(2) where defendant indicated during incident that he was attempting to kill victim and stomped victim in head multiple times with steel-toed shoe, and where defendant caused victim to incur concussion, long-term headaches, lacerations to face and broken nose.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing lifetime term of supervised release in addition to 97-month term of incarceration on possession of child pornography charge. While lifetime term of supervised release was permissible, remand was required where Dist. Ct. failed to provide rational for length of supervision or identify any conditions of said supervision. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals directed Dist. Ct. to consider on remand defendant’s arguments concerning his alleged low risk of recidivism, as well as any interaction between length of supervision and its conditions.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging her murder conviction on grounds that state trial court improperly excluded proposed testimony of defendant’s six-year-old son, where trial court ultimately found that said son was incompetent to testify. Exclusion of said witness violated Compulsory Process Clause of Sixth Amendment where son’s proffered testimony that death of victim (defendant’s other son) was accident when: (1) said son provided best evidence of defendant’s innocence; (2) trial court improperly placed on defendant burden of proving competency of her son; and (3) trial court’s concerns about son’s age-appropriate beliefs in mythical or fictional characters and son’s response to confusing question from trial court did not reliably indicate that son’s testimony was likely to be unreliable. Ct. further found defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare defendant’s son for competency hearing or present exculpatory evidence from known investigator to counter claim that son had trouble distinguishing fantasy from fiction.

In prosecution on charge of conspiracy to conduct gang activities through pattern of racketeering activity under 18 USC section 1962(d), Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that his guilty plea to said charge was invalid because sexual assault incident referenced in his guilty plea was not one of predicate acts of racketeering identified in indictment. Conviction under section 1962(d) does not require proof that defendant committed two predicate acts of racketeering, but only that defendant had entered into agreement that some members of conspiracy would commit two or more predicate acts. Thus, no fatal variance between indictment and guilty plea occurred since inclusion of sexual assault conduct in plea was unnecessary. Remand, though, was required for new sentencing hearing where Dist. Ct. imposed enhancement that was not raised by govt. in initial sentencing hearing.