Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court's order granting State's petition for involuntary admission must be reversed where instant hearing was delayed 97 days after respondent requested jury hearing on said petition. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court's order, found that while some amount of delay beyond applicable 20-day period for conducting said hearing set forth in Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code was warranted since respondent made jury request 14 days after matter was initially called for hearing, instant 97-day delay was unreasonable and prejudicial to respondent where record showed that there was no attempt to comply with deadline set forth in Mental Health Code.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly assessed $50 State's Attorney fee after finding that defendant's section 2-1401 petition to review his sentence was frivolous. Appellate Court affirmed said assessment, but defendant argued in his petition for leave to appeal that said assessment was improper since statute allowing for assessment of State's Attorney fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(a)) did not expressly mention section 2-1401 petitions as being subject to said fee.

This case presents question in prosecution on murder charge as to whether trial court properly admitted testimony that defendant told his wife that he intended to kill her, as well as eventual victim at issue in murder charge, even though defendant claimed that said statements were privileged under Illinois marital privilege law. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant's conviction, found that such statements were privileged from disclosure under 725 ILCS 5/115-16 since said statements were made to wife privately at time defendant and wife were still married and did not otherwise concern any limited exception that would permit disclosure of statements. Fact that statements were made at time when there was lack of marital harmony between defendant and wife was irrelevant.

This case presents question as to whether record contained sufficient evidence to establish forgery conviction under 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1) where defendant merely endorsed her own name on reverse of fraudulent check upon which she was named payee, and where State failed to present evidence that defendant had created said check. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant's conviction, found that defendant's endorsement alone satisfied making or altering element of forgery statute since act of endorsement made check capable of defrauding third-party.

This case presents question as to whether trial court, in prosecution on financial institution fraud and other crimes stemming from defendants' alleged submission of false information on real estate loan applications, properly struck from state's witness list co-defendant, who, as former attorney of another co-defendant, objected to giving any testimony concerning communications he had with former client based on attorney-client privilege. While trial court found that state failed to show that crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege had applied so as to permit such testimony, Appellate Court concluded that trial court had erred in failing to consider whether in camera review should have been done. Moreover, Appellate Court held that co-defendant/former attorney could be forced to disclose all of his communications with his former client since grand jury testimony of third-party would give reasonable person cause to suspect that former client used communications with his former attorney to advance former client's attempts to commit crimes or fraud.