Criminal Law

In prosecution on fraud and money laundering charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, even though defendant had argued that he was under influence of psychotropic drugs at time of guilty plea, and that said drugs had clouded his mind and rendered instant plea involuntary. Denial of motion to withdraw was appropriate where defendant did not exhibit any signs of confusion during plea colloquy, and defendant failed to present any medical evidence to support his claim that switch in medications had dramatic effect on his decision-making abilities.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress warrantless seizure of rifle found in defendant’s chain-link fenced backyard, where police officer had been involved in investigation of report of series of gunshots. Record showed existence of exigent circumstances that supported instant seizure where: (1) officer discovered bullet holes in car parked near defendant’s backyard, as well as bullet holes in nearby duplex and trail of nine spent casings near and in defendant’s backyard; and (2) officer could properly believe at time he entered backyard that someone may have been recently shot and in need of immediate aid. Fact that two hours had elapsed since report of gunshots did not require different result. Moreover, defendant could seize rifle where rifle’s scope and breech were in plain view.

Ct. of Appeals granted respondent-prison official’s motion to dismiss as moot petitioner’s appeal from denial of his habeas petition that had challenged respondent’s revocation of six months of good time credit under provision of state statute as penalty for petitioner’s filing of frivolous motion as defined by said statute in litigation against state. Record showed that respondent has now restored all of petitioner’s good-time credits, and petitioner failed to establish any exception to mootness doctrine. Prior to instant ruling, Ct. of Appeals had certified underlying legal question to Ill. Supreme Court.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal on charge of solicitation to commit violent federal crime against juror who participated in trial that resulted in conviction of Matt Hale, where instant trial concerned defendant’s posting on website that advocated advancement of white supremacy message that everyone associated with Matt Hale trial “deserved assassination,” as well as his publication of home address and phone numbers in posting that others used to contact juror who had participated in Hale’s trial. While Dist. Ct. found that jury’s guilty verdict could not stand since defendant’s web postings were not objective criminal solicitations and thus constituted protected speech under First Amendment, Ct. of Appeals held that reasonable juror could have found that defendant’s postings constituted proposal to engage in unlawful activity, and that defendant was aware that his postings might induce readers to commit violent acts against juror mentioned in postings. Moreover, because criminal solicitation is not protected by First Amendment, govt. was entitled to reinstatement of guilty verdict.

In prosecution on mail and wire fraud charges stemming from defendants’ participation in Ponzi-like schemes designed to dupe victims into investing millions of dollars into programs designed to fail, one defendant waived ability to challenge admission of civil consent order entered into by said defendant arising out of his participation in schemes at issue in charged offenses, where his defense counsel failed to object to said admission. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s issuance of limiting instructions, as well as lack of any reference in consent order to another defendant, sufficiently removed any prejudice caused by admission of consent order with respect to remaining defendants. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting: (1) two prior felony convictions for larceny by conversion and for forgery where defendant preemptively testified about both convictions during his direct examination; and/or (2) series of e-mails that served to rebut one defendant’s defense that certain mortgage transaction was not part of charged scheme, where govt. used circumstantial evidence to authenticate instant emails.