Criminal Law

In prosecution on bank robbery charges, Dist. Ct. did not deprive defendant of his 6th Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when it admitted testimony of defendant’s prior attorney, who stated that defendant had requested him to forward letter asking another individual to provide defendant with false alibi to charged offense. Said testimony did not violate lawyer-client privilege since defendant was not asking for legal advice when requesting prior counsel to forward letter, and applicable ethical rule permitted prior attorney to disclose existence of letter that contained evidence of defendant’s commission of crime of attempted subordination of perjury. Moreover, prior attorney had withdrawn as attorney for defendant at time he testified as govt. witness, and defendant could not assert that his prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for actions taken after he had withdrawn from case. However, said testimony should have been excluded under Rule 401 as being unduly prejudicial in relation to its probative value. Any error, though, was harmless where other evidence strongly established defendant’s guilt.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge alleging that defendant distributed lethal dose of heroin to victim, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in admitting medical examiner’s post mortem report indicating that heroin was sole cause of death even though someone had crossed out cocaine intoxication as contributing cause of death. Defendant’s counsel stated that he had no objection to introduction into evidence all of govt.’s medical documents, and although defendant argued that admission of said report violated Confrontation Clause since defendant had no opportunity to cross examine author of report, defendant failed to show under plain error standard that outcome of trial probably would have been different where other medical evidence established that victim died from heroin overdose.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to reduce his 20-year sentence on possession of crack cocaine in light of retroactive amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, as well as Fair Sentencing Act. Fair Sentencing Act did not apply to defendant where his conviction and sentence occurred prior to Act’s effective date, and defendant was not entitled to any reduction of his sentence unless Act applied.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's habeas petition seeking to overturn his wire fraud convictions that had been prosecuted under alternative theories that defendant had aided and abetted scheme to defraud State of Illinois of its money and of its right to honest services of its employees. While holding in Skilling, 130 S.Ct. 2896, potentially applied where Skilling found that honest-services fraud statute is limited to scheme involving bribes or kickbacks, plaintiff's wire-fraud convictions could still stand in spite of any Skilling error, since record showed that jury could not have convicted defendant for honest services fraud had it not been convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted money-fraud scheme.

In prosecution on drug offenses involving crack cocaine, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendants to 180-month and 48-month terms of incarceration even though defendants argued that they were entitled to new sentences since Dist. Ct. had failed to apply reduced crack to powder cocaine disparity ratio found in Fair Sentencing Act (Act). Record showed in both cases that Dist. Ct. had appropriately applied 18-to1 reduced ratio contained in said Act when determining defendants' applicable sentencing guideline range, and that their sentences were otherwise reasonable. However, remand was required for 180-month term of incarceration with respect to third defendant where there was no evidence indicating that Dist. Ct. had applied 18-to-1 crack to powder cocaine disparity ratio, or that Dist. Ct. would have given same sentence had it applied said ratio.