Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court had properly dismissed five gun-related charges from defendant's 6-count indictment where defendant had originally been charged by information with single count of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and where State obtained instant indictment containing both drug and new gun-related charges more than 160 days after defendant had demanded trial on cannabis charge. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that cannabis and new gun-related charges were required to be prosecuted in single prosecution because they were based on same act of defendant's constructive possession of drugs and guns, which were discovered by police at same time. Moreover, Appellate Court held that under compulsory joinder-speedy trial rule, State was required to file instant gun-related offenses within 160 days following defendant's arrest on drug charge.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant to 23-year term of incarceration on armed robbery charge where: (1) sentence was based in part on 15-year enhancement for use of firearm during commission of robbery as set forth in section 18-2(b) of Criminal Code; (2) section 18-2(b) was held to be unconstitutional in Hauschild, 226 Ill.2d 63, on grounds that it violated proportionate penalties clause; and (3) Illinois legislature had amended armed violence statute to remedy proportionate penalties clause violation as identified in Hauschild. Appellate Court, in remanding case for new sentencing hearing, found that instant 15-year enhancement was not revived by legislature's subsequent amendment to armed violence statute and concluded that legislature must take some action on section 18-2(b) after Hauschild court's determination of its unconstitutionality before section 18-2(b) could be used at sentencing.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly found that evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of uncharged, lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in case charging defendant with predatory criminal sexual assault where Appellate Court had initially found that State had failed to prove defendant's guilt on predatory criminal sexual assault charge, and where Ill. Supreme Court had issued supervisory order instructing Appellate Court to consider whether evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that his conviction on charge of predatory criminal sexual assault should have been vacated outright since aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge is not lesser-included offense with respect to charge of predatory criminal assault under abstract elements test, and since State waived any request for lesser-included offense treatment that was made for first time in State's prior petition for leave to appeal where it had failed to request said treatment during instant trial.

This case presents question as to whether State could file interlocutory appeal in juvenile delinquency proceeding of trial court's order granting minor's motion to suppress minor's statement. Appellate Court, in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider State's interlocutory appeal, rejected State's contention that Rule 604(a)(1) was incorporated into Rule 660(a) that pertained to appeals in juvenile proceedings and found that State may not bring interlocutory appeal in juvenile proceeding from order granting juvenile's motion to suppress.

This case presents question as to whether defendant was entitled to new trial on two counts of attempted murder based on defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to inform him during unsuccessful plea negotiations that he could potentially receive consecutive sentences if case went to trial. Appellate Court, in remanding case for resumed plea negotiation and new trial if necessary, found that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's erroneous advice that consecutive sentences would be improper. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that 6th Amendment right to counsel should not extend to plea negotiations that result in plea rejection since defendant could never establish prejudice component under Strickland where defendant otherwise received fair trial.

This case presents question as to whether trial court was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress gun that was discovered by police where police had stopped vehicle in which defendant was passenger, and where gun was discovered by police when it fell to ground during chase of defendant, who had fled stopped vehicle. Trial counsel was not ineffective since any motion to suppress gun would have been without merit even if police lacked probable cause to stop vehicle since defendant was not seized within meaning of 4th Amendment at time police discovered gun during their chase of defendant.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly ordered defendant to register as sex offender after defendant had been found unfit to stand trial on charges of indecent solicitation of child and unlawful restraint, and after trial court had found in discharge hearing that defendant was "not not guilty" on unlawful restraint charge. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that his certification as sex offender violated his procedural due process rights where instant certification was made in spite of fact that he had not been afforded trial to determine his guilt on unlawful restraint offense.

This case presents question as to whether Appellate Court properly remanded case back to trial court for new appointed-counsel fee hearing to determine defendant's ability to pay such fee, where any hearing would occur more than 90 days after entry of original final order disposing of his case in trial court. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that trial court's initial imposition of appointed-counsel fee should simply be vacated under Gutierrez, 2012IL 11590, without any remand since 90-day requirement for conducting such hearing under section 113-3.1 is mandatory.