Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder based on his committing felony attempted aggravated vehicular hijacking. Taking instructions as a whole, jury was sufficiently instructed as to proximate cause and felony murder to reach lawful conclusion as to Defendant's guilt or innocence. Court did not err in giving use of force instructions to explain why vehicle owner was not liable for victim's death even though he shot victim. Court properly responded to jury's question by referring jury to instructions tendered, as they were readily understandable and sufficiently explained relevant law. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and admitted other-crimes evidence under Section 115-7.3. Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing introduction of four other crimes as to same victim; it reflected propensity evidence and provided context, to show that incidents were not isolated and to show pattern of conduct. Court within its discretion in allowing other witness to testify as to Defendant's improper touching of on 20 occasions; prejudicial effect did not outweigh probative value. No error in court not providing limiting instructions contemporaneously with evidenc, and jury was sufficiently apprised of distinction between charged and uncharged conduct. No ineffective assistance of counsel as to counsel's strategic decisions on instructions. (HUDSON and McLAREN, concurring.)

Court improperly granted motion of Defendant, charged with weapons possession and drug offenses, to suppress evidence and statements. Trooper's testimony of his method of determining time interval between vehicles, for offense of following too closely, was sufficient to justify traffic stop. Trooper reasonably relied on Illinois Rules of the Road guideline that driver is following too closely when less than a two-second interval between vehicles. Seventeen-minute duration of traffic stop, mostly to check driver's license and FBI number and determine if impaired, was reasonable and not unnecessarily prolonged to write warning ticket. Evidence of training, experience, and procedures of trooper and narcotics-detection dog sufficient to rebut prima facie case of improper basis for vehicle search. (DONOVAN and SPOMER, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/15/12.) /Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on a meritorious legal theory: that a defendant has the right to decide whether to plead guilty, and his counsel's failure to disclose plea offer to defendant may give rise to constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, regardless of whether defendant subsequently received a fair trial. Whether counsel informed Defendant of plea offer cannot be resolved at first stage of postconviction proceedings as it requires credibility determination. (QUINN and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder, and 50-year sentence was enhanced by 40 years for use of firearm in murder. Court erred in admitting testimony of Defendant's wife which should have been excluded as marital privilege. Statute prohibits testimony as to communications and admissions made as to any private conversation between husband and wife during the marriage, regardless of whether marriage was harmonious. (STEELE, concurring; MURPHY, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder. Defendant's postconviction petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in unauthorized waiver of his presence during in camera jury selection conference. Defendant failed to offer evidence or assertions that his absence from conference led court to empanel a biased jury harboring prejudices against Defendant. Thus, Defendant failed to state gist of claim of prejudice. (MURPHY and SALONE, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, after previous conviction for burglary, and sentenced to 4 1/2 years. Prior burglary conviction elevated offense from Class A misdemeanor to Class 2 felony, and mandated sentencing range was 3 to 14 years. Court did not impermissibly enhance penalty by counting prior burglary conviction an element of offense and also as enhancement, but imposed special penalty range set by legislature. (CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/9/12.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Defendant alleged deprivation of due process because prison officials in Kentucky, where he was imprisoned, failed to notify him of his right to request final disposition of charges underlying detainer issued by Saline County, IL State's Attorney. Dismissal of indictment, information, or complaint is not an available form of relief where officials in the sending state violate the notice requirement of Article III of Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Defendant, even after being apprised of his right to request final disposition, did not request a final disposition. Defendant failed to establish that prison officials' violation of Interstate Agreement prejudiced his defense and his ability to have a fair trial. (WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 5/8/12.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home repair fraud. State violated Defendant's due process rights by presenting two incorrect statements of the law before grand jury, resulting in actual and substantial prejudice to Defendant. State incorrectly relied on subsection (c) of Home Repair Fraud Act despite it being severed from Act in Supreme Court case of People v. Watts. State and testifying witness incorrectly claimed that intent is not an element of the crime. Circuit court is directed to dismiss indictment without prejudice upon remand. (CONNORS, concurring; QUINN, specially concurring.)