Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 5/16/12.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI. Language in statute allowing for probation for conviction only when "extraordinary circumstances" is not unconstitutionally vague, and was intended to grant deference to trial court. Court properly found that extraordinary circumstances were lacking, and properly refused to consider as a mitigating factor that fatality victim, his passenger, induced Defendant to drink and drive while intoxicated. (DONOVAN and SPOMER, concurring.)

Defendant entered open guilty plea to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and later moved to withdraw plea based on his attorney's failure to advise him that plea would result in lifetime sex offender registration. Court properly entered directed finding in favor of State, after hearing on Defendant's motion. Counsel's failure to mention lifetime registration requirement was not affirmative misrepresentation as to requirement. Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice by only bare assertion that he would not have pled guilty, but would have gone to trial, had he known of registration requirement. (JORGENSEN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder of three-year-old by striking him in abdomen. Defendant, age 16 at time of incident, was not denied substantive due process when he was automatically transferred to adult court pursuant to automatic transfer of Juvenile Court Act. Knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant's statement to police was not diminished by finding of unfitness, based on opinion that Defendant was unable to assist in his defense at time of trial, many months after statement was made. (TURNER and COOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful delivery of controlled substance. State improperly shifted burden of proof to Defendant during closing arguments, by commenting on questions that defense counsel should have asked but did not. State's comments were not so inflammatory or so flagrant that Defendant was denied a fair trial, as State did not directly state that Defendant had a burden to support his theory, but suggested that all evidence pointed against Defendant. State's comments that jury should avoid speculating were not directives to avoid considering defense theory of case, but arguments that defense theory lacked support in evidence and should thus not be given weight. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Victim was parking his car when man, holding what victim believed was a gun, approached him and ordered him out of his car. Victim testified that he saw the gun for only an instant, but he got a slight glance at the barrel. Testimony was conflicting as to extent of victim's injury, but was sufficient to find that Defendant used gun in dangerous manner during course of hijacking, and that gun was of size and weight sufficient to cause bleeding when Defendant put it up against victim's head. Court erred in giving instruction which imparted erroneous statement of law that handguns are categorically classified as dangerous by courts, and thus jury could have sidestepped disputed factual issues. (EPSTEIN and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of three counts of first-degree murder. Defendant did not make substantial showing he was deprived of sixth amendment right to choice of counsel. Defendant was informed about his counsel's ongoing dispute with ARDC and was allowed to discuss matter with counsel, and court and counsel both told Defendant it was his choice whether to continue to retain him, and Defendant repeated his certainty that he wanted to keep his counsel. Defendant failed to show prejudice in counsel's decision not to call forensic expert at trial, given extensive evidence against him. (HOFFMAN and KARNEZIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder and aggravated battery. Defendant filed successive postconviction petition, which included 2006 report of special prosecutors as to pattern of criminal conduct by police toward suspects at Area 2 police station. Court improperly dismissed petition claims in which Defendant presented new evidence that crucial testimony, which led trial court to admit testimony that Defendant confession at Area 2 police headquarters, came from police officer who committed perjury in similar cases. Ineffective assistance of counsel by failure to raise trial counsel's failure to interview eyewitness who, in affidavit, swore that Defendant did not shoot victims. (MURPHY and SALONE, specially concurring.)

Jury found Respondent to be a sexually violent person under Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, and court ordered him committed to IDHS for institutional care in secure facility. Court properly denied Respondent's motion in limine to stipulate to his prior convictions for sexually violent offenses and to preclude State from referring to the name of those convictions. State was required to prove that Respondent had been previously convicted of certain sexual offenses, and elicited testimony to allow its experts to explain basis for their opinions, and court explained limited purpose of evidence of past misconduct.g Respondent was not denied a fair trial by State arguing details of his past crimes; State's rebuttal remarks were in response to defense counsel's remarks in closing as to timing of misconduct, and court instructed jury that closing arguments were not evidence. (EPSTEIN and J. GORDON, concurring.)