Criminal Law

People v. Radcliff

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Fair Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-1400
Decision Date: 
Thursday, June 23, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
STERBA
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and burglary, and judgment was entered only on the former charge. Trial judge was absent from the bench while defense counsel cross-examined a State witness as to incident report, and witness looked at incident report. Then judge returned, and defense counsel continued cross-examination of witness. Defendant's right to fair trial was compromised because court did not call a recess and the cross-examination of witness continued in the complete absence of the presiding trial judge. (NEVILLE and SALONE, concurring.)

People v. English

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Res Judicata
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 3-10-0764
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 27, 2011
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Henry Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
SCHMIDT
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child, and sentenced to natural life. Court refused to instruct jury on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant could have, on direct appeal, raised issue of whether his conviction for aggravated battery of a child properly served as the predicate forcible felony to support his felony murder conviction, but he did not, and thus consideration of issue is barred by res judicata. Felony murder predicated on aggravated battery is a valid and existing crime in Illinois. (CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)

People v. Logan

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-07-1768
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 27, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
ROCHFORD
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder. Court properly denied Defendant's petition for postconviction relief after evidentiary hearing. Court did not err in admitting polygraph evidence for limited purpose of rebutting witness' allegations of coercion, and thus appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Taken together, court's oral limiting instruction and IPI 1.01 (Criminal) sufficiently informed jury that it was not to speculate as to results of polygraph examinations. Defense trial counsel had numerous specific strategic reasons for changing his mind about calling alibi witnesses, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel in not calling alibi witnesses even though he had, in opening statement, promised to jury that he would do so. (HALL and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

House Bill 1253

Topic: 
Sex offender registration
(Mell, D-Chicago; Martinez, D-Chicago) requires a sex offender or sexual predator, who has never previously been required to register under this Act, to register if the person has been convicted of any felony offense after July 1, 2011. A person who previously was required to register under this Act for a period of 10 years and successfully completed that registration period must also register if: (1) the person has been convicted of any felony offense after July 1, 2011; and (2) the offense for which the 10 year-registration was served currently requires a registration period of more than 10 years. Passed both chambers.

House Bill 3238

Topic: 
DNA from registered sex offenders and some arrestees.
(Mendoza, D-Chicago; Raoul, D-Chicago) requires all registered sex offenders to provide a DNA sample regardless of their conviction or where they were convicted. It also requires a DNA sample from arrestees of serious, violent crimes and sex crime after a grand-jury indictment or a Section 109-3 hearing in which a judge finds probable cause to believe the arrestee committed one of the triggering offenses. Passed both chambers.

U.S. v. Abebe

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-3966
Decision Date: 
June 29, 2011
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianpolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 180-month term of incarceration on armed robbery charge even though applicable guideline called for sentence in 84 to 105-month range. Fact that Dist. Ct. stated that it sought to impose "reasonable" sentence and failed to state obligation to set sentence at "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" level did not constitute error. Moreover, instant above-guideline sentence was reasonable given circumstances of bank robbery that included fact that defendant shot bystander in face.

People v. McCarter

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-2864
Decision Date: 
Friday, June 24, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
GARCIA
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of five crimes. Defendant's conviction for armed robbery is reversed due to lack of admissible evidence to establish that victim was ever robbed. Conviction for aggravated kidnapping is thus vacated, which was for aggravated kidnapping, based on commission of armed robbery, and remanded for entry of judgment on a valid aggravated kidnapping count. Conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking reversed, where no evidence was presented that Defendant ever deprived victim of possession of his car. Court was free to ignore witness' trial testimony in favor of her prior inconsistent statement that incriminated Defendant for murder of gunshot victim found in burning car in wooded area. (McBRIDE, concurring; R.E. GORDON, dissenting.)

U.S. v. Durham

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. Nos. 10-1308 et al. Cons.
Decision Date: 
June 28, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing two defendants on attempted bank robbery charges when applying bodily injury enhancement under section 2B3.2(b)(4)(A) of USSG, even though defendants claimed that applicable victim required for said enhancement was either bank or U.S govt. Dist. Ct. could properly find that individual, who sustained injuries when kidnapped by defendants, was "victim" for purposes of enhancement where said individual was used by defendants to obtain ransom from bank. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in sentencing third defendant to 170-month term of incarceration on attempted bank robbery charge based in part on erroneous finding that defendant's prior convictions concerned gun-related charges. Ct., though, rejected said defendant's unrelated argument that Dist. Ct. should have considered defendant's mental impairment as mitigating factor where defendant had failed to raise said argument in Dist. Ct.

U.S. v. Johnson

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-2503
Decision Date: 
June 28, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part and remanded
Dist. Ct. did not err when finding during sentencing proceeding that defendant was accountable for 23 grams of crack cocaine based on series of telephone calls that constituted evidence of drug transactions through use of code words. However, Dist. Ct. erred by not expressly responding to defendant's repeated requests for reduced, one-to-one crack-to-powder ratio when calculating amount of drugs at issue in instant drug conspiracy charge. Ct. of Appeals, though, rejected defendant's request to bar Dist. Ct. from using 100-to-1 ratio in remanded sentencing hearing.

People v. Grant

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Probable Cause
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-1107
Decision Date: 
Friday, June 10, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed.
Justice: 
GARCIA
Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of Class 4 possession of cocaine. Court improperly denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest, as his arrest was not supported by probable cause. Officer took Defendant into custody for violating provision of Chicago Municipal Code which prohibits using a public way to "solicit any unlawful business". Officer heard Defendant yell "dro, dro" to a passing car (which did not stop), as Defendant stood alone outside entrance to CHA building. Officer testified that "dro, dro" referred to a certain type of cannabis, and that Defendant had been standing in a "weed spot". Complaint alleging only conduct of yelling "dro, dro" is insufficient as matter of law, as it does not inform a reasonable person that phrase is slang for cannabis. (McBRIDE, specially concurring; R.E. GORDON, dissenting.)