Criminal Law

In habeas petition challenging imposition of death sentence on murder charge, Ct. of Appeals remanded matter back to Dist. Ct. for determination of defendant's claims in habeas petition that were not resolved by Dist. Ct. prior to govt. appeal of Dist. Ct.'s granting of habeas petition on defendant's 6th Amendment claim. Ct. of Appeals reversed Dist. Ct. on 6th Amendment issue in that it rejected defendant's claim that death sentence was invalid where prosecutor had initially offered to forego death penalty if defendant would waive jury trial. Ct. of Appeals also rejected defendant's claim that he was incompetent when waiving certain state post-conviction remedies.

In prosecution on felon in possession of firearms charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting testimony that defendant had told his girlfriend that anyone who informed on him “would be put in the ground,” even though defendant claimed that said “bad acts” evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Said testimony, which suggested attempted intimidation, was admissible to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Similarly, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence that defendant jokingly brandished gun in parking lot since said evidence served as direct evidence of defendant’s guilt on charged offense.

Dist. Ct. erred in treating defendant's motion to amend his habeas petition as improper successive petition and then dismissing his original habeas petition under circumstances where none of claims made in defendant's original habeas petition were contained in proposed amended petition. While Dist. Ct. has broad discretion to construe proposed amended petition as disguised successive petition under circumstances where defendant had abandoned his original petition, Dist. Ct. could not make instant ruling where there had been no final ruling with respect to defendant's original habeas petition. Accordingly, remand was required for determination as to whether motion to amend was filed in bad faith, and if so, whether defendant should be required to proceed solely on allegations contained in original petition.

In prosecution on series of wire fraud charges stemming from defendant's participation in certain real estate transactions, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte strike testimony of seven lay witnesses who used words fraud and misrepresentation in response to prosecutor's questions regarding significance of false information provided by defendant in her loan applications. Said testimony was helpful to jury where said witnesses were employees of lenders involved in defendant's transactions, and use of disputed terms did not serve as improper comments about defendant's mens rea. However, remand was required for re-determination of defendant's sentence and restitution order, where Dist. Ct. had failed to make sufficient findings with respect to number of victims, as well as scope of defendant's scheme to defraud others.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion for new trial on claim that prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose evidence contained in third-party's plea agreement indicating that key witness for govt. in instant case was involved in uncharged murder. While defendant argued that murder evidence was material to outcome of his trial because he could have used said evidence to establish witness' bias in giving testimony favorable to govt., Dist. Ct. could properly have found that murder evidence was not material and would not have changed outcome of defendant's trial since defense counsel fully impeached witness in instant trial with fact that witness had incentive to testify in favor of govt. because he was already facing serious drug, weapons and RICO charges that carried potential life sentence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion, alleging that his initial habeas counsel had failed to properly raise issue as to whether defendant’s trial counsel labored under conflict of interest when said counsel testified on behalf of defendant at defendant’s trial, as well as acted as defendant’s co-counsel. While Dist. Ct. improperly found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider said motion, after finding that said motion served as successive habeas petition, Ct. of Appeal, in considering merits of claim, found that defendant was required to show that any conflict resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Ct. further held that defendant had failed to show existence of any prejudice arising out of trial counsel’s dual role as witness and as co-counsel where: (1) counsel testified favorably on behalf of defendant; and (2) there was no chance that counsel’s dual role confused jury since defendant had participated in bench trial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 240-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy and crack distribution charge where said sentence was based in part on imposition of obstruction of justice enhancement due to defendant's failure to appear at original sentencing hearing. Dist. Ct. properly rejected defendant's claim that said enhancement was improper, even though defendant claimed that he skipped original sentencing hearing out of fear of his former gang members, since: (1) defendant's personal motivations for not showing up for sentencing hearing are generally irrelevant; and (2) defendant's flight of several years defeats any claim that he lacked reasonable opportunity to cease his obstructionist behavior. Ct. also rejected defendant's claim that his sentence was unreasonable even though certain co-defendants received relatively lighter sentences since said co-defendants did not flee their sentencing hearings and had cooperated with govt.

In prosecution on drug charges, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's request for new trial on claim that govt.'s key witness provided false testimony at trial, and that govt. was aware that said testimony was false but submitted it anyway. Witness provided key testimony linking defendant to drug conspiracy by describing alleged incidents that occurred in presence of third-party, when govt. eventually conceded that said third-party was in prison at time of alleged incidents. Moreover, said testimony had likelihood of affecting jury's guilty verdict. Ct. rejected govt. argument that no misconduct occurred because witness was merely mistaken as to timing of said events, and Ct. futher noted that prosecutor was aware that third-party was in prison prior to witness presenting said testimony.