Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly imposed $200 DNA analysis system fee on defendant, where said fee was not subject to defendant's presentence incarceration credit. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that said imposition was fee (as opposed to fine) that was not subject to presentence incarceration credit since said fee has purpose of seeking reimbursement for cost to State for obtaining DNA analysis for convicted defendants.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant's third and fourth successive petitions for post-conviction relief where defendant alleged claim of actual innocence with respect to his murder conviction. While defendant attached three affidavits to establish that he was elsewhere at time of murder, and that someone else was culprit, Appellate Court found that said evidence was either untimely (since defendant could have established any alibi defense at trial) or not conclusive of innocence (since affidavit by individual claiming responsibility for murder conflicted with defendant's detailed confession and would not have called into question voluntary nature of defendant's confession). (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant's request seeking leave to file second successive post-conviction petition, where said petition alleged that his confession was product of torture perpetrated by police officers under control of Jon Burge, and where said petition cited to 2006 Report of Special State's Attorney that found beyond reasonable doubt that police officers under Burge's command had engaged in torture tactics. While defendant's torture claims had been rejected in prior post-conviction petition, Appellate Court, in reversing trial court and directing it to hold evidentiary hearing on defendant's second successive post-conviction petition, found that defendant had satisfied cause-and-prejudice test so as to permit filing of instant petition where Report supported defendant's claim that officers named by defendant had been involved in torture of suspects, and where use of coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt prejudiced defendant because said use could never constitute harmless error.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed as untimely defendant's pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel that had been filed 119 days after entry of guilty verdict and 40 days after date of final judgment. Appellate Court, in remanding matter for Krankel hearing on defendant's motion, held that said motion was sufficiently detailed so as to fall within exception to rule that generally prohibits represented defendants from filing their own pro se motions, and that said motion was timely because it had been filed during pendency of defense counsel's motion to reduce defendant's sentence, when trial court still had jurisdiction over case.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant's pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain ruling on his motion in limine to bar use of evidence of his prior convictions to impeach his credibility where trial court did not rule on said motion until after defendant had testified. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that res judicata applied because Appellate Court had found no error on same issue in direct appeal, after concluding that trial court had performed necessary balancing test to determine admissibility of said evidence and had appropriately waited to make said ruling because it lacked sufficient information to make ruling at time motion was filed. Ct. also found that Patrick, 233 Ill2d 62, which held that it was error under certain circumstances for trial court to wait to make ruling on similar in limine motion until defendant had testified, did not apply retroactively.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant's motion to quash his arrest on charge of aggravated driving under influence where defendant was initially stopped on belief that defendant had committed offense of improper lane usage. While state argued that officer had probable cause to make said traffic stop when he observed defendant cross center line for brief duration on two occasions, Appellate Court, in affirming suppression order, found that no reasonable police officer could have believed that defendant was engaging in improper lane usage in absence of any observation that defendant actually drove for reasonably appreciable distance in more than one lane. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether defendant was properly convicted under section 407(b)(2) of Ill. Controlled Substance Act of delivery of controlled substance within 1000 feet of real property comprising any school, where record showed that defendant was within 1,000 feet of preschool. Appellate Court, in reducing defendant's conviction from Class 1 felony to Class 2 felony, found that convictions under section 407(b)(2) did not cover situation where defendant was within 1,000 feet of preschool.