Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to life imprisonment on various crimes relating to possession and sale of crack cocaine where case had been remanded to Dist. Ct. to consider under Kimbrough whether disparate treatment of crack versus powder cocaine rendered defendant's life sentence unreasonable. Dist. Ct. failed to consider whether life sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with sentencing purposes set forth under section 3553(a)(2). Moreover, Dist. Ct.'s reluctance to depart from guidelines based on concern for disparities with sentencing decisions of others imposed under earlier sentencing scheme was improper.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to life imprisonment on drug distribution charge based, in part, on finding that defendant played role in murder of confidential informant in his case. Dist. Ct. properly used preponderance of evidence standard when applying murder cross-reference under section 2D1.1 of USSG and could consider, in part, police officer's testimony that jailhouse informant had told officer that defendant had admitted to helping make arrangements to have informant killed. Fact that Dist. Ct. noted that defendant had used four different attorneys throughout criminal proceeding did not constitute 6th Amendment violation where reference was used only to support observation that defendant was merely manipulating others to avoid consequences for his own actions.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of unregistered firearm charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress statements made with respect to ownership and location of said firearm where defendant's statements came while he was in custody on unrelated state charge and prior to any receipt of Miranda warnings. Ct. rejected govt. argument that said statements were voluntary where: (1) prior to defendant's oral statement, police presented defendant with arrest warrant on said state charge and with court order directing him to turn over all firearms in his possession; (2) police repeatedly directed defendant to comply with court order; and (3) defendant had failed to take medication for his mental disease at time of statement. Fact that defendant gave separate written statement two hours after his oral statement and after he had received Miranda warnings did not require different result where two-hour gap was insufficient to remove taint from first improperly obtained confession.

In prosecution on drug-related charges arising out of wiretap recordings and stings involving defendant-police officer, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress wiretap evidence even though defendant argued that govt. had failed to establish necessity element required to obtain wiretap. Govt. need not show that wiretap request was made as last resort in criminal investigation, and instant application was sufficient to establish necessity element where affidavit laid out limited success of techniques that had already been used, which had resulted in failure to apprehend number of co-conspirators. Fact that govt. already had enough evidence to arrest defendant at time of wiretap application did not preclude finding of necessity where application showed demonstrated need to root out additional co-conspirators.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 8-year term of re-imprisonment upon revocation of defendant's term of supervised release stemming from his conviction on four counts of production, receipt, distribution and possession of child pornography. While instant sentence was within statutory maximum had defendant been originally sentenced to four terms of supervised release (as opposed to one, six-year term of supervised release that was part of defendant's original sentence), record did not demonstrate that Dist. Ct. considered recommended sentencing guideline range for revocation of supervised release, which for instant Grade C offenses would have been only three to nine months term of incarceration for each offense. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not consider whether instant sentence would lead to unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants.

In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of sawed-off shotgun, Dist. Ct. did not err in permitting govt. to elicit testimony from defendant's wife regarding defendant's aggressiveness, even though defendant argued that said evidence was improper under Rule 403. Defendant's wife gave testimony about ownership of shotgun that conflicted with her pre-trial statement indicating that defendant had owned gun, and evidence of defendant's aggressiveness was relevant with respect to wife's credibility and was offered as potential explanation for wife's inconsistent statements in light of fact that wife was still living with defendant.