Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of attempted murder and attempted armed robbery. Evidence that a shooting by Defendant a month prior to incident involved the same gun justified the court's decision to permit evidence of other crime, to bolster identification of Defendant as offender in present case. Although defense counsel should have objected to evidence of what Defendant said to victim during meeting when victim tried to obtain incriminating evidence as agent for State, and court should have excluded that evidence. However, no reversible error, as admissible evidence overwhelmingly proved Defendant guilty. (QUINN and STEELE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted after jury trial of aggravated battery of hospital employee. Court did not err in conducting fitness restoration hearing, as no indication that Defendant was unable to understand proceedings or assist in his defense during trial. Defendant failed to establish purposeful discrimination in jury selection, and reasonable explanations existed for State's decisions in jury selection. No plain error in court failing to admonish potential jurors of Defendant's right not to testify, as Defendant does not claim that this failure resulted in a biased jury; and as evidence was not closely balanced given witness testimony as to his attack on hospital employees. (CAHILL and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder. Given witnesses' testimony as to prior observations of Defendant and victim in altercations and hearing Defendant's statements to victim, and two independent, non-related eyewitnesses placing Defendant at scene of crime, jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant killed victim. Court erred in failing to question each juror individually as to principles of Rule 431(b), but no plain error as evidence was not closely balanced. Errors did not cause trial to be fundamentally unfair, as each principle was touched upon in voir dire by court or by prosecutor . As each (O'BRIEN, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, joined by O'BRIEN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of murder after bench trial. Court ordered Defendant to pay $359 fees and costs, after summarily dismissing Defendant's postconviction petition. Section 22-105 of Code of Civil Procedure, which allows imposition of fees and costs for "frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners", includess postconviction petitions summarily dismissed per res judicata or forfeiture, which are necessarily frivolous or patently without merit. Fee provision in Section 22-105 does not violate principles of due process or equal protection; it does not restrict a prisoner's meaningful access to courts, and is rationally related to goal of stemming tide of frivolous silings by prisoners. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was indicted on one count of identity theft, under Illinois Identity Theft Law. Section 16-15(a)(7) of Identity Theft Law, which prohibits using any personal identification information or document to access any record without the other person's express permission, is facially unconstitutional under state and federal constitutions. That section of statute potentially punishes a significant amount of wholly innocent conduct not related to statute's purpose, and statute is thus an invalid exercise of police power and is not reasonably related to purpose of statute. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant, who was serving sentences for two murders, claimed violation of due process in parole hearings and in amendments to parole hearings and procedures. There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released from confinement prior to expiration of a valid sentence, as the conviction, with its procedural safeguards, has extinguished the right to liberty. Illinois parole statute does not create a legitimate expectation of parole that rises to level of liberty interest protected by procedural due process. Parole Board's revised interpretation of the "seriousness of the offense" criterion, to require murderers to serve more time before being paroled, does not violate ex post facto clauses. Amendment to Section 3-3-5(f) of Unified Code of Corrections, which provides for less frequent parole hearings, does not violate ex post facto clauses of federal and state constitutions, and does not create a significant risk of increasing a defendant's incarceration. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was stopped for having parked her truck illegally on sidewalk. Dog sniff revealed presence of methamphetamine. Dog sniff is not a search within meaning of fourth amendment, and conducting a "set-up procedure", by ordering a defendant to roll up her vehicle windows and turn the ventilation air blowers on high, before conducting the dog sniff at the exterior of the vehicle, is not sufficiently intrusive to compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, and GARMAN, concurring; FREEMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, dissenting.)

Defendant, having been released on bond, failed to appear when guilty verdicts were returned for armed violence and aggravated battery, and he was sentenced in absentia. Defendant had not been properly admonished that trial could proceed if he failed to appear; even though Defendant had signed a bond slip, printed warnings on it were insufficient to satisfy statutory requirements if the verbal admonitions had not been given. Section 113-4 of Code of Criminal Procedure unambiguously requires trial court to admonish a defendant in open court. Warning on bond slip, provided outside presence of court, is not a blanket waiver of such admonishment. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, and BURKE, concurring; THOMAS, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, dissenting.)