Criminal Law

Defendant police sergeant was convicted, after bench trial, of multiple offenses relating to alleged criminal sexual assault while officer was on duty, official misconduct and kidnaping. Victim's admitted crack addiction bears upon her propensity for deceit and her capacity to observe and retain information accurately. Court's findings that victim's testimony was corroborated, and was uncontradicted, were erroneous, and that testimony was highly relevant to the proof necessary to establish whether Defendant was acting in his official capacity at time of incident. Inconsistencies seriously undermined victim's testimony on material points and made it impossible for any fact finder reasonably to accept any part of her testimony; and court relied on an improper inference and misstated evidence. Thus, Defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (KARNEZIS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed Defendant's complaint for writ of mandamus to compel Illinois State Police to correct his information on Sex Offender Registry, as he failed to show that Defendants had a clear duty to do so. Amended provision of Sex Offender Registration Act, tolling 10-year registration requirement during periods of incarceration, which clarified long-standing requirement that sex offenders must register for a total of 10 years, is applicable to Defendant, regardless of whether he had notice of amendment. (SPOMER and WEXSTTEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault and armed robbery. Defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation as he did not show that counsel was ineffective during counsel's examination of victim at suppression hearing, at trial, or on appeal, and thus court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition at second stage. Manner of cross-examination and decision whether to impeach witness are matters of trial strategy of professional judgment. Even if court erred in admitting evidence of K-9 ("bloodhound") tracking, Defendant was not prejudiced as tracking led to two blocks from where Defendant was later arrested, and both victims gave multiple strong identifications of Defendant. (CAHILL and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant represented himself pro se in jury trial, and was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery. Court substantially complied with Rule 401(a) as to waiver of counsel prior to allowing Defendant to proceed to trial pro se. Court was not required to readmonish Defendant after Court adequately addressed Zehr factors in voir dire. Defendant criticized and rejected four assistant PDs appointed to represent him, two of whom were reappointed and then discharged, and proceeded pro se on seven different occasions. No indication that, had Defendant been re-admonished, his trial strategy would have changed or he would have been able to introduce medical records in evidence. Court was within its discretion in not appointing standby counsel; Defendant indicated familiarity with legal concepts, and likely would not have made a difference, given overwhelming evidence against Defendant. (GARCIA and CAHILL, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated batter, and aggravated domestic battery. At trial, Defendant admitted stabbing the victim, his girlfriend, 23 times in her chest, back, and arms, but denied that he intended to kill her. Court refused to excuse trial judge's husband from jury for cause, but defense counsel did not exercise his two peremptory challenges which then remained, and accepted him on panel. Had counsel later exhausted peremptory challenges, judge could have exercised discretion to grant request for additional peremptory challenge. Given overwhelming evidence of Defendant's intent to kill, court properly barred defense from referring, during closing arguments, to victim's alcohol consumption. Court did not "impose" sentence, but pronounced it, when it misstated 20 years as sentence, then recessed briefly due to outburst by spectator, then stated correction of sentence to 24 years. (MYERSCOUGH, concurring; POPE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of two counts of felony DUI under Section 11-501(d)(1)(A) of Vehicle Code, and two counts of DUI under Section 11-50(c-1)(4) of Code. As charges were based on same conduct, conviction was entered only on one count, a Class 1 felony, due to four prior DUI convictions. Other Sections of Vehicle Code make a fourth DUI a Class 2 felony, and thus coexist constitutionally with Section under which Defendant was properly sentenced as a Class 1 felon. Passage of Public Act 94-116 set up coherent and consistent scheme by which any 5th DUI would be Class 1 felony, and any 4th DUI would be, at most, a Class 2 felony. Passage of two more Acts shortly thereafter was not intented to upset this arrangement by making a Class 1 felony a lesser included offense of several Class 2 felonies. (BOWMAN and BIRKETT, concurring.)