Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty, after jury trial, of first degree murder of occupant of car which was travelling behind a car toward which Defendant intentionally fired two bullets, in a crowded street. Defendant's intent to kill can be inferred from this act; and it is reasonable to conclude that Defendant knew that his actions were practically certain to result in death or substantial injury of another. Although Defendant offered some evidence of self-defense, the State provided rebutting testimony that after firing shots, Defendant laughed, fled from police, and tried to destroy evidence; thus, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Defendant was the aggressor.(J. GORDON and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of incident, was charged with first degree murder in beating death, and State subsequently charged him with attempted first degree murder arising out of the same incident. Defendant entered plea to attempted murder charge in exchange for dismissal of murder charges and a 15-year sentence in DOC. Offenses "covered by" section 5-130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act include those "specified in" that section as well as those arising out of the same incident. Thus, the attempted first degree murder charge was "covered by" section 5-130(1)(a), regardless of subsequent dismissal of first degree murder charge, because the offense to which Defendant pled guilty arose out of the same incident. Defendant was thus properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing as to whether he should be sentenced as a juvenile. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of two counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. Defendant failed to establish that "rare" case where a "complete breakdown" in the chain of custody occurred such that he would be permitted to challenge the discrepancy for the first time on appeal; the police officer's description of the chain of custody, combined with the stipulated testimony of forensic scientist from ISP Crime Lab, negated the Defendant's argument, and the State satisfied its prima facie case. A chain of custody challenge is an attack on the admissibility of the evidence, and is thus subject to the ordinary rules of forfeiture. Thus, the waiver rule bars Defendant from raising, for the first time on apeal, a challenge to the discrepancy in the oral recitation of the stipulation; police officer testified that he had recovered five packets of heroin, but oral recitation stated that forensic scientist had tested nine packets of heroin. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

When counsel neglects to file a Rule 604(d) certificate of compliance, the appropriate remedy is a remand for the filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate; the opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentence, which filing is not required if counsel concludes that a new motion is not necessary; and a new motion hearing. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of nine counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The victims, who were then Defendant's 8-year-old stepson and 11-year-old stepdaughter, testified at trial and accused Defendant of having committed the offenses. Thus, hearsay statements of children to sheriff and his employee during interviews were properly admitted, and Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated, as victims testified in sufficient detail as to the events to allow for effective cross-examination at trial. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant offered to hold a three-week-old infant while infant's father was completing paperwork at a medical clinic. Defendant then disappeared and was later found in a restricted area of a hospital, holding the infant which she had wrapped in a newly purchased baby towel. Defendant's conviction for offense of aggravated kidnapping was proper, as the element of secret confinement was satisfied by Defendant's actions which isolated the baby from the public, by passing the baby off as her own, even though she kept the baby in public view. "Secret confinement" is not limited to instances where the victim is clearly confined within a physical structure. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKER,and THEIS, concurring.)