Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, for the ninth time, of driving with revoked or suspended license. Court improperly treated as substantive evidence a copy of a neighbor's videotape (allegedly showing the defendant driving) which had been altered to omit portions of the original. Proper foundation must be established for all evidence, including video, in order for it to be admissible as substantive evidence. Proper foundation is essential because the risk of modification, manipulation, and fabrication of images is present even when a live witness is available to testify to the condition of the tape. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder, aggravated kidnaping, and robbery; and his codefendant was also convicted in a simultaneous bench trial. Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition which alleged that his conviction should be vacated because the crime lab serologist perjured herself as to DNA samples. State did not claim that Defendant was in close proximity to victim or to any bodily fluids; thus, serologist's testimony, even if it were shown to be perjury, was immaterial. Defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision in stipulating to testimony of serologist and fingerprint analyst; thus, no ineffective assistance of counsel. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion and armed robbery. Court did not err in rejecting Defendant's supplemental questions during voir dire regarding racial and ethnic bias as to whether potential jurors would be prejudiced against race and ethnicity of Defendant and an accomplice witness.The record contains few references to race, mostly coming from the defense in exaggerated racial innuendo during opening statement, including as to interracial marriage, thereby tainting the proceedings with an irrelevant issue, and the questions would have injected race into the trial. Court's voir dire was insufficient under Rule 431(b), as it failed to ascertain whether the venire understood and accepted each principle, and failed to mention the principle that the Defendant is not required to testify. However, evidence was not closely balanced, even given jury's note indicating impasse early in deliberations, and thus Defendant forfeited this issue as he made no objection during trial. (FITZGERALD SMITH and J. GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant entered blind plea of guilty to offense of failure to support, a Class 4 felony, under Non-Support Punishment Act, and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution of $85,802. Prejudice from Defendant's inadequate guilty plea admonishments was compounded by court's ex parte denial of Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, and thus plea must be vacated. Court did not mention, in plea hearing, that restitution or a fine could be ordered, although restitution is an indispensable element of the offense, and must be ordered upon conviction. Court was required to admonish Defendant of the spectrum of potential consequences of his plea, including restitution. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

After jury trial in 1986, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder. Defendant presented evidence of actual innocence to support further proceedings undet the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as Defendant alleged the gist of an actual innocence claim by newly discovered evidence through the affidavit of an eyewitness to the shooting. Defendant satisfied cause and prejudice test, as he provided State's discovery disclosures which do not mention any eyewitness to the shooting; and Defendant points out weaknesses in State's witness' testimony that a second eyewitness could overcome if the trier of fact found the second witness more credible; and Defendant described his attempts to seek mandamus to obtain grand jury transcripts and police reports. (NEVILLE and STEELE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession with intent to deliver heroin within 1000 feet of a public park. Court may properly take judicial notice of park's location as north of intersection where Defendant was seen in hand-to-hand drug transaction, as shown on Google Maps, as it is a sufficiently reliable mainstream website. Evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant was within 1000 feet of public park from the time he was first seen in transaction to when he was apprehended. Defendant failed to establish denial of due process in having been shackled during bench trial, as did not object at trial, and he failed to set forth specifically why he was denied a fair trial or was impeded from assisting his counsel. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced toa total of 24 years inmprisonment. Court's inquiry whether venire would follow the instruction that "defendant does not have the burden of proving himself innocent" sufficiently conveyed the principle that Defendant was not obligated to present any evidence on his behalf. Because victim testified at trial, none of the statements admitted per Section 115-10 of Code of Criminal Procedure were improper. The Confrontation Clause places no constraints on the use of declarant's prior testimonial statements when the declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial. Court was not required to conduct Frye hearing as evidence pertaining to child-sexual-abuse-accommodation syndrome is generally accepted. Crime Stoppers fine of $100 was improperly imposed, as statutory authority for such fines is limited to conditions of probation, conditional discharge, and supervision, not incarceration. (BURKE, concurring; McLAREN, specially concurring.)