Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 1/7/11.) Defendant, after bench trial, was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and was committed to DOC for indefinite period of treatment. Court was aware of the volitional-capacity requirement as it related to the mental disorder element. The court's specific finding that Defendant lacked the ability to control his sexual behavior was supported by ample evidence, including history of inappropriate sexual behavior since his childhood. Finding was supported by the expert opinion testimonies of three experts, including testimony that Defendant lacked remorse and thus could not regulate his own behavior and that Defendant had described himself to police and to a psychiatrist as a "male nymphomaniac". (WRIGHT, specially concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

(Cour opinion corrected 1/10/11.) Defendant was convicted of gang-related shooting and murder; at trial, court had denied Defendant's request for continuance after the close of the State's evidence in order to locate and produce a witness who had not been subpoenaed for that day. Defendant filed post-conviction petition which was dismissed after a third-stage evidentiary hearing at which the previously missing witness testified, and at which a State witness recanted his trial testimony. Court's ruling, which was based almost exclusively on finding that both witnesses were not credible, was not against manifest weight of evidence. Witnesses had provided different and contradictory versions of events of day of shooting, at different times. (GARCIA and CAHILL, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder of one victim, and of attempted first degree murder of another victim. Police officer testified that he read Defendant his Miranda rights, and learned that Defendant was 17 years old. Defendant's answers to officer's questions, implicating himself in the shooting, were a "course of conduct indicating waiver" of his right to remain silent. Defendant exhibited a clear understanding of his right to counsel, and did not make an unequivocal, unambiguous request for counsel at any time. Videotape statement shows no outward indications that Defendant had a disability, and thus does not support his claim that his confession was involuntary, even though Defendant has a very low IQ and reading level. (MURPHY, concurring; NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Police officers, who observed a car in motel parking lot with its engine running, noticed a bullet sticking up in a plastic bag on the center console. Officers immediately removed occupants from vehicle, handcuffed them, and placed each in custody without determining whether bullet was evidence of a crime, and without making inquiry of whether occupants had a FOID card or were convicted felons. Officers improperly escalated the investigative stop into a full arrest of the Defendant and then engaged in search of vehicle as incident to the arrest; thus, court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress the bullets and gun unlawfully seized by the police. (HALL, concurring; LAMPKIN, dissenting.)

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful use of weapon by felon and aggravated battery, and was sentenced to nine years imprisonment; plea agreement also provided for imposition of court costs and fees. Circuit clerk lacked authority to impose fines, and lacked authority to reduce to zero the DNA analysis assessment. Drug-court and children's advocacy center assessments are fines, rather than fees, and thus must be imposed by the court, not the circuit clerk. (KNECHT and POPE, concurring.)

During the middle of his jury trial for the beating and death by drowning of a two-year-old child, Defendant pled guilty to murder, and was thereafter sentenced to 32 years imprisonment. After court failed to admonish Defendant of three-year MSR term, court reduced his sentence by three years, but refused to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant's plea was a negotiated plea, as Defendant had requested Rule 402 conference during which court stated that if Defendant were to plead guilty he would sentence him to 32 years; and after State presented some witness testimony Defendant asked to take court's earlier offer of 32 years. Court's decision to grant Defendant relief in reducing sentence indicates that plea was negotiated. (GALLAGHER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

(Court opinion of 11/12/10 withdrawn.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm. Court dismissed his postconviction petition at first stage of proceedings. Court did not deprive Defendant of due process or fair trial when it delayed ruling on motion in limine to exclude prior convictions until after he testified. Supreme Court's holding in People v. Patrick case announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure: that a trial court's failure to rule on a motion in limine on admissibility of prior convictions when it has sufficient information to do so is an abuse of discretion and infringes on a defendant's right to testify in his own behalf. The Patrick holding does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and Defendant's claim is thus barred by res judicata. Counsel was not deficient for failing to request a reckless conduct instruction, as no evidence supported the giving of that instruction. (O'BRIEN and LAVIN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/16/10.) Defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. Judge called jury into courtroom at 8 p.m., after seven hours of deliberation and told jury they would be sequestered overnight in a hotel, but then permitted them to continue deliberating, after jury foreperson stated jury was "close"; thirty minutes later, jury reached verdict. Court did not improperly coerce jury's verdict. Short span of time in reaching verdict does not conclusively indicate that verdict was coerced, especially where jurors volunteered that they were close to reaching verdict and needed only half an hour to conclude deliberations, and based on jury's request for trial transcripts and for legal definition of "intent to kill", jury appeared to thoroughly consider the evidence and charges, and to understand their duty. (KARNEZIS and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Statement made to police officer by wife within a few minutes after husband had left with their 19-month-old child was admissible under excited utterance exception to hearsay, and were nontestimonial because officer was addressing an ongoing emergency. Wife was still at the scene in a nervous, upset, and agitated condition, directly related to the event, and her child was absent. (LYTTON, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)