Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of violating the armed habitual criminal statute after jury trial. No plain error in court combining two Zehr principles during voir dire, as court's questions were sufficiently broad so that if any juror had indicated any concern, it would have revealed a lack of understanding or acceptance of a defendant's right not to testify, and as Defendant failed to show that jury was not fair and impartial. Armed habitual criminal statute is not unconstitutional. Because certain prior felony convictions are elements of the offense, a bifurcated trial was unnecessary. (O'BRIEN and FROSSARD, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, and residential burglary, after jury trial. Court erred by denying Defendant's request to provide jury with separate instructions and verdict forms for felony murder. Defendant was charged with two counts of felony murder, based on two different predicate felonies; thus, general verdict form did not provide specificity necessary for the court to sentence Defendant properly, as the sentencing consequences are different for each theory. Court properly sentenced Defendant to natural life imprisonment, as even though other persons were also involved, the Defendant fully participated in the events that led to victim's death. Court did not err in refusing to give modified IPI 1.02 as to admitted drug addiction of one of State's witnesses, as evidence of witness' drug use was before the jury, and she was subject to cross-examination. (QUINN and MURPHY, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion. Court summarily dismissed as frivolous his postconviction petition. Court properly dismissed petition, which alleged that he stated gist of a constitutional claim in his allegation that one juror was crying during victim's testimony. Record did not affirmatively establish that juror was crying, but instead indicates that court called recess because one juror needed to use restroom. Defendant failed to effectively raise issue in trial court; thus, court had no opportunity to remedy any claim of prejudice. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and sentenced to natural life in prison. State proved that Defendant acted in a manner to threaten or endanger life; Defendant attacked victim from behind as she was unlocking the door to her building, and used threat of a weapon to force victim to comply. Facts of Defendant's 1994 sexual assault of a different victim are sufficiently similar to be admissible and probative toward propensity to commit sex crimes, both attacks having occurred after midnight, when the victims were alone and were unlocking their car or building. No prejudice to Defendant by defense counsel's promise in opening statement that Defendant would testify about what really happened, where Defendant did not testify, on advice of his counsel; evidence against Defendant was overwhelming, and had Defendant testified at trial, it would have conflicted with victim's testimony and his own confession to detective. (R.E. GORDON, concurring; GARCIA, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with theft of $40,200 from local bank. Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress bank records, as State violated her right to privacy, under search and seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution when it procured bank records pertaining to her and her husband without first obtaining a subpoena. The privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution extends protection to bank records, which is greater protection for bank records than the federal constitution provides. The Banking Act did not exempt the State from obtaining a subpoena or warrant for these records during its criminal investigation. "Inevitable discovery" doctrine is inapplicable, as no evidence in record shows that failure to obtain a subpoena or warrant was due to a mistaken reliance on the Banking Act, and there was no testimony that an independent investigation was in progress at time records were obtained. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Defendant, convicted upon guilty plea of drug offense, filed Section 2-1401 petition two years later, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during plea proceedings. Defendant filed petition with court but did not serve the State with petition by certified or registered mail. Proper remedy for improper service of Section 2-1401 petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel is the quashing of service, not the dismissal of the petition, as such service error is a technical error. (O'MALLEY and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of indecent solicitation of a child. Jury was not properly instructed, in accordance with the then-effective version of Section 11-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to find that Defendant acted with requisite intent; however, no plain error, as evidence of Defendant's intent, and that victim (age 13) was under age 17 at time of offense, was overwhelming. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to object to outdated jury instruction, or to improper statement during closing argument which vaguely suggested that witness had given prior statement to police, as Defendant was not prejudiced by either. (HOFFMAN and PATTI, concurring.)

Respondent, a Roman Catholic priest, had been adjudicated a sexually violent person. Court properly ruled that Respondent could be conditionally released, after serving term of incarceration for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of three minors. Court's implied finding that State's expert had ignored or manipulated the original actuarial test scores to provide support for her opinion was not contrary to manifest weight of evidence. Record supports trial court's consideration of all statutory factors in concluding that conditional release, with extensive restrictions and conditions, is appropriate. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)